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Abstract 
There has been some concern that the pace of expectations being built up regarding the 
transfer of ownership of the economy into the hands of the previously disadvantaged 
was not allowing for the due diligence and analysis of the implications of such 
transactions. Tax legislation relating to the transfer of assets is also not seen to be 
consistently conducive to this process. The focus of this thesis is taxation and a critical 
analysis of how the current tax legislation affects most of the transactions which usually 
form the basis of black economic empowerment. It is argued that tax policy is one of the 
fundamental instruments available to government to encourage the process of black 
economic empowerment. It is therefore important to assess whether or not current tax 
legislation is supportive of the process of black economic empowerment and to suggest 
ways in which it can be amended to serve this purpose. 
By means of a literature review and a case study of a Black Economic Empowerment 
deal in the financial sector, the thesis examines various sections of the Income Tax Act, 
58 of 1962, which may have a bearing on black economic empowerment transactions 
and structures, including corporate restructuring rules, the taxation of trusts , inter-
company loans, the use of hybrid financial instruments, the taxation of small business 
corporations, employee share incentive schemes, connected persons rules and value-
shifting arrangements, the general deduction formula and the deductibility of interest 
incurred on amounts raised to acquire shares. It appears that although some aspects of 
the current tax legislation lend themselves to assisting black economic empowerment 
transactions, there are still areas where much improvement is required. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and context 
1.1 Introduction 
Black Economic Empowerment (referred to as BEE) has become one of the most 
contentious and interesting topics in South Africa. The far-reaching extent of its scope 
and importance of its objectives, however, makes it more challenging and significant for 
researchers to contribute to this field of commerce. The focus of this thesis is on taxation 
and a critical analysis of how the current tax legislation affects most of the transactions 
which are usually encountered in BEE initiatives. References are made to the relevant 
legislation which governs the financial sector specifically, this arguably being the industry 
most affected by the BEE compliance burden and its commensurate tax effects. 
The main issue addressed in this thesis is the fact that, although BEE is designed to 
transfer ownership of economic assets into the hands of South Africa's previously 
disadvantaged communities, the restructuring processes that have to be followed, 
coupled with the business structures that are of necessity commonly used, increase the 
tax burden for the BEE participants. 
1.2 The context of research 
1.2.1 The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act, 53 of 2003 
The Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act, 53 of 2003 (the BEE Act) was 
signed into law by the President of South Africa on 9 January 2004. Adapted from 
section 1 of the Act is the following important definition of BEE: 
An integrated and coherent socioeconomic process that directly contributes 
to the economic transformation of South Africa and brings about both 
significant increases in the number of black people that manage, own and 
control the country's economy as well as significant decreases in income 
inequalities. 
The Act also provides a definition of broad-based black economic empowerment 
(outlined in more detail in chapter two) . The definition includes empowerment in terms of 
human resource and skills development, increases in the numbers of black people that 
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own and manage businesses and other productive assets, preferential procurement and 
encouraging investment in black owned and managed enterprises. 
The provisions of the BEE Act outline the broad economic empowerment objectives of 
the government. From these objectives, it is apparent that there is necessarily a crucial 
role to be played by commercial funding structures to enable the parties to BEE 
transactions to attain the outlined objectives. This thesis therefore is a discussion of 
how, in this context, taxation should assist the process of financing these transactions. 
The following are the main facets of taxation legislation which are analysed in order to 
highlight the role of taxation in fostering BEE objectives. 
1.2.2 Taxing the transfer of assets 
As previously stated, the restructuring processes that have to be followed in order to 
transfer ownership of the country's economic assets into the hands of the previously 
disadvantaged communities appear to have the potential to increase the tax burden for 
the BEE counterparties. Kolitz et al (2004) advise that Part III of the Income Tax Act, 58 
of 1962 (the Income Tax Act) provides for tax relief in the form of deferrals of taxation 
and rollovers of asset values between entities, for qualifying company transactions and, 
provided that the requirements of sections 41 to 47 of the Act are met, the adverse tax 
implications of these transactions can be eliminated, minimised or deferred . Kolitz et al 
(2004) provides a summary of the provisions of these sections and these are elaborated 
on in chapter three. 
1.2.3 Inter-company loans 
As many of the BEE schemes involve company restructuring in one form or another, the 
effectiveness of the provisions of the Act relating to these transactions is of crucial 
importance, especially the provision of inter-company debt. This thesis has also 
considered the possible impact of sections 8(4)(m) and 20(1 )(a)(ii) of the Income Tax Act, 
as well as paragraphs 12(5) and 56 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act. Section 8(4)(m) 
provides for the deferral of taxable recoupments on the disposal of assets and only 
applies if the transaction giving rise to the debt was previously a deductible expense. It is 
also subject to the provisions of section 20(1 )(a)(ii) which, in essence, provides that the 
balance of any assessed loss shall be reduced by the value of any benefit received from 
a concession granted, or compromise with the creditors whereby liabilities have been 
reduced, provided such liabilities arose in the ordinary course of business. In this regard, 
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the thesis has considered the finding of the leading South African case of Commissioner 
for Inland Revenue v Datakor Engineering (Ptv) Ltd, [1998] 4 All SA 414 (A), 57 SATC 
178, where the conversion of debt into equity, which resulted in a reduction of an 
assessed loss for tax purposes, was found to be a definite compromise. The details of 
this case and the relevance in the context of black economic empowerment transactions 
are analysed in chapter three. 
1.2.4 Disposal or acquisition of equity shares 
A relatively new section in the Income Tax Act, section 24N, defers the inclusion in gross 
income of amounts arising from the disposal of an asset (specifically the disposal of 
equity shares), which are not quantifiable in the year of assessment during which the 
asset is disposed of. Such amounts will only accrue or rank for deduction in the year that 
they become quantifiable, that is, when they become due and payable. 
1.2.5 Employee share acquisitions 
Also in the context of BEE, is the well-known concept of broad-based black economic 
empowerment. To this end, most companies now have employee share ownership 
schemes. Section 8B of the Income Tax Act was enacted to provide for the taxation of 
any amounts received by or accrued to employees from 'qualifying' equity shares 
acquired in terms of a broad-based employee share plan. De Beer et al (2004) argue 
that, where all the requirements of section 8B are met, there are essentially new tax 
consequences on the disposal of shares held by an employee from an employer share 
option scheme. 
1.2.6 The taxation of small business corporations and personal service companies 
In the past decade significant progress has been made by the government in order to 
improve the taxation effects on small business corporations. One of the pillars of such 
government support is the understanding that small businesses are engines of economic 
growth and employment creation. As such, chapter three of this thesis includes an 
analysis of the taxation implications of small business corporations as defined in section 
12E of the Income Tax Act. 
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However, there is a contention that the taxation of 'personal service companies' as 
defined, is punitive. The argument against the taxation of personal services companies 
is that the effects of the taxation of these small, medium and micro enterprises, which 
are also usually black owned operations, as "personal services companies" as defined in 
paragraph one of the Fourth Schedule to the Income Tax Act, is that their entire income 
is subjected to employees' tax. The foregoing results in 35 percent of gross receipts paid 
to them being withheld for the payment of PAVE, resulting in cash flow constraints for 
the small businesses. Furthermore, the Act limits the deduction of expenditures incurred 
by these businesses only to salaries paid to employees. This could result in perpetual 
losses for these small operations and invariably they may end up having to shut down. 
1.2.7 The use of preference share funding and hybrid financial instruments 
Scholz (2005) has also argued that the fact that a significant number of BEE 
transactions have used preference share capital in order to enable the BEE parties to 
obtain the necessary funding at more affordable rates is important. Jordaan et al (2005: 
239) state that "the low cost of capital has made these preference-share deals 
advantageous". Additionally, Zinman (2004) is of the opinion that preference shares 
have been available as a financing tool from the very origins of company law. This 
research also includes an investigation of the tax consequences of these preference 
share-funding structures in the context of BEE. 
In analysing the relevant sections of the Act, specific attention has also been paid to 
section BE of the Income Tax Act which has, as its purpose, to govern the use of 
preference shares and, in particular, "to counter the tax avoidance brought about by the 
use of so-called preference share financing schemes" (Huxham et ai, 2005: 369). 
Section BF of the Income Tax Act, which limits the deductibility of interest paid in respect 
of hybrid debt instruments, is also discussed. 
1.2.8 The tax deductibility of interest incurred on amounts raised to acquire 
shares 
BEE transactions inherently reflect a significant need for debt funding. In order to acqUire 
the shares which are a usual subject of BEE transactions, the BEE participants are often 
required to raise loans usually from the formal financial sector. Section 23(f) is discussed 
in this thesis as it prohibits the deduction from income, of interest expenditure incurred 
on amounts raised to acquire shares. The argument is that this provision was aimed at 
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those transactions which sought to deduct interest expenditure on amounts raised 
merely to earn tax free dividend income. This thesis has shown that BEE transactions 
are not only concerned with share acquisitions in order to earn dividends, the process is 
more complex as it underlies broad-based economic empowerment objectives as well. 
This discussion , which is contained in chapter four, is preceded by an analysis of the 
mechanics of the general deduction formula as contained in section 11 read with section 
23 of the Income Tax Act. 
1.2.9 Connected persons rules and value shifting arrangements 
Where an asset is disposed of to a 'connected person' as defined in section 1 of the 
Income Tax Act, for a consideration which does not reflect an arm's length price, the 
connected persons provisions contained in paragraph 38 of the Eighth Schedule to the 
Income Tax Act, require the Commissioner for the South African revenue services 
(SARS) to apply the market value of the asset as the proceeds of the transaction in 
question. This has the adverse effect of increasing the tax liability arising from the 
transaction. BEE transactions require leaner price-setting mechanisms which would 
allow for affordability of the assets in question, amongst other imperatives. The 
'connected persons' provisions are discussed in detail in chapter five . 
Furthermore, paragraph 35A of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act provides for 
value-shifting arrangements. These are only applicable, however, if the change in the 
interest in a company is as a result of a transaction which did not occur at market value. 
These arrangements are also briefly discussed in chapter five. 
1.2.10 Industry charters 
The provisions of the BEE Act also relate to aspects of the Financial Sector Charter 
(referred to as the FSC). Although the FSC was intended as a guideline, it forms an 
important benchmark against which BEE structures are measured. It is important to 
ascertain whether the provisions of the Income Tax Act currently cater for BEE 
transactions and how they could be aligned more closely to the needs of BEE and the 
current legislative framework in this context. 
It is argued that tax authorities need to realize the importance of commercial structures 
of BEE transactions and to be conscious of the inevitable challenge that they pose to our 
country. The challenge is to legislate and amend such legal principles which appear not 
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to be conducive to the process of BEE in order to obtain some alignment between 
government policies and the tax regime concerning BEE. 
Kolilz et al (2004) argue that, even if further tax incentives are not recommended , the 
consequence of entering into BEE structures should , at the very least, be tax neutral. 
Yet current tax legislation does not differentiate BEE transactions from other company 
reorganizations and transfers of ownership, with the result that potentially onerous tax 
liabilities are being imposed upon parties entering into BEE structures. 
In tandern with the arguments above, Scholtz (2005: 13.1) argues that, 'Tax is a 
significant factor in the implementation of BEE transactions. It will play a role in 
determining how BEE participation is to be funded ... ". Notwithstanding that these tax 
considerations are a significant factor in the facilitation of BEE transactions, it appears 
that there has to date been very little change introduced into the Income Tax Act 
specifically in order to facilitate BEE transactions. 
1.3 The goals of the thesis 
The following are some of the main questions to which answers were sought: 
• Which aspects of the taxation legislation are conducive to the process of BEE 
and which aspects can be said to be restrictive? 
• How does the current taxation legislative framework increase the tax and 
compliance burden in relation to certain BEE transactions? 
• What are the tax implications of preference share funding structures? 
• What are the restrictions which exist in the taxation of some small, medium and 
micro enterprises? 
• How can current legislation and practice be enhanced and changed to be more 
conducive to the process of BEE, in terms of the taxation consequences? 
1.4 Methods and design of the research 
The research process included an in-depth analysis and interpretation of the various 
legislative enactments impacting on BEE structures and other relevant literature in the 
field, for the purpose of defining the meaning of BEE and reviewing what has been 
written on the topic, as this process relates to taxation. Thereafter, a case study 
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consisting of a BEE structured finance company has been used to examine the 
importance of BEE, to provide a synopsis of the BEE process and to outline problems in 
the existing tax legislation that discourage or could potential ly discourage many 
taxpayers from entering into BEE structures. Possible amendments to the Income Tax 
Act to remove these tax barriers are highlighted , as revealed from the literature review 
and the case study. The scope of the thesis is limited to a detailed analysis of a case 
study in the finance sector and examples of particular types of transactions, which are 
the usual subjects of BEE transactions, with a view to ascertaining their consequential 
tax implications. 
Furthermore, from the literature review in chapter two, the thesis defines the background 
of BEE in the South African context and outlines the current legislative concessions 
provided by the Income Tax Act, which can be utilised in the context of BEE transactions 
in general. Additionally, views on particular sections of the Act, which are regarded as 
punitive to BEE transactions, are discussed. 
In chapter three, a focused analysis of the current tax legislative framework is carried 
out. This is done in order to highlight the specific sections of tax legislation which affect 
most BEE transactions. In carrying out an analysis of the tax implications of preference 
share funding structures in the fourth chapter, this thesis gives an outline of the changes 
which have been introduced to section 8E of the Act by showing how this section 
impacts on preference share funding by banks of BEE transactions, these being referred 
to as "strategic transactions" specifically in the context of BEE funding. The analysis is 
done to highlight the impact of this section on preference share funding structures and 
therefore certain BEE transactions, before and after the legislative changes. Additionally 
also in chapter, the provisions of a new section, section 8F are examined. This is 
followed by an illustration by way of one case study in chapter five of a BEE transaction 
in the financial sector. The study covers specific provisions of the Act which could 
potentially adversely affect a BEE deal in the financial sector. Chapter six provides the 
conclusions flowing from the research and contains a summary of the findings and 
recommendations. 
In complying with ethical reqUirements, appropriate action has been taken to protect the 
anonymity of the finance company, which has agreed to be the subject of the case 
study. All other documents which have been used in the research are in the public 
domain. 
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1.5 Conclusion 
The overarching theme of the discussion presented above is the fact that tax authorities 
need to appreciate the importance of the commercial structures underlying BEE 
transactions and to be conscious of the inevitable challenge of the need to amend such 
legal and tax procedural principles that appear not to be conducive to the process of 
BEE. Furthermore, as Mazwai (2003) rightly states, it is unfortunate that most 
empowerment transactions merely focus on the news-making headlines of the 
transaction , leaving the real bus iness case, costs and actual implementation as an 
afterthought. This does not build up the necessary skills base amongst business of 
understanding, before the deal is concluded, what the likely taxation dispensation would 
be for specific BEE transactions. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
As BEE is a relatively new concept, most of what has been written on the topic has been 
in the popular press and very little research has been done of the impact of taxation on 
BEE transactions and structures. This chapter comprises a limited review of the relevant 
literature. The intention is to analyse and interpret the literature in the field of black 
economic empowerment (referred to as BEE) and taxation. This chapter also gives a 
background to BEE in the South African context. This discussion is important, as it 
constitutes the foundation upon which the taxation effects on BEE transactions are 
discussed in the chapters that follow. 
2.2 The Black Economic Empowerment landscape 
The disenfranchisement of the majority of the South African population 
during the apartheid era left a legacy of poverty, a huge discrepancy 
between the wealthy and the impoverished and a scarcity of people from 
the disadvantaged groups, particularly black people, in positions of 
leadership. Kolitz et al (2004: 1). 
Kolitz et al (2004) further argue that apart from being denied opportunities and access to 
education, this sector of the population was often also denied access to ownership and 
investment in land and businesses. 
It is estimated by Kolitz et al (2004) that since the African National Congress (ANC) 
government came to power in 1994, the correction of this inequality has been a priority 
and there have been various initiatives to economically empower the historically 
disadvantaged community, but these have not always produced the desired results. 
Indeed, the correction of this inequality was recognized by the ANC even before it came 
to power. 
Economic transformation through black economic empowerment is an important 
underpinning of South Africa's continued development. Kolitz et al (2004) state that there 
is also a strong argument that in order to accelerate investment, government should 
introduce financial and tax incentives in support of empowerment transactions as it is 
argued that preferential tax provisions will encourage largely white-owned companies to 
take the steps necessary to integrate previously disadvantaged individuals into the 
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economy. So far, the government has given very little indication that it will introduce such 
incentives and is generally known to be opposed to using widespread tax incentives to 
achieve economic objectives. 
Kolitz et al (2004) argue that even if tax incentives are not recommended, the 
consequence of entering into BEE structures should, at the very least, be tax-neutral. 
Yet current tax legislation does not differentiate BEE transactions from other company 
reorganizations and transfers of ownersh ip, with the result that onerous tax liabi lities 
may possibly be imposed upon parties entering into BEE structures. 
To make matters worse, tax concessions available in terms of the Act, which provide 
rollover relief from capital gains tax and income tax for company reorganisations and 
transfers of ownership, often do not apply to BEE structures because one or more of the 
requirements of those sections cannot be met. Consequently, the parties entering into a 
BEE structure may end up paying more tax than would be the case in an ordinary 
commercial transaction. 
2.3 The definition of BEE 
There is often a tendency in South Africa to define BEE narrowly and to 
equate it with the development of a black capitalist class. The narrow 
definition focuses on the entry and transaction activities of black people in 
business, especially what is commonly referred to as BEE investment 
holding companies (BEE Commission Report 2000: 11). 
The above definition of BEE depicts a limited view of only the experiences and 
challenges faced in the establishment of big BEE companies, which are usually led by 
the stalwarts of the historical struggle for liberation dispensation, and significantly 
ignores the experiences of small and medium businesses and the development of skills. 
The broader definition, which is the approach the BEE Commission anchored its 
research in , argues: "The fundamental crisis in our economy is that black people remain 
excluded from financial and economic resources. BEE must incorporate comprehensive 
strategies, which are aimed at increasing access to productive assets whilst 
simultaneously ensuring the productivity of those assets" BEE Commission 
(2000:12).The definition of BEE is therefore a broad all-encompassing one and this 
broad definition is accepted for the purposes of this research. 
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In addition, Scholtz (2005) believes that the most cruel consequence of the legacies of 
apartheid is a deficit of skills amongst black people, attributable to an inferior black 
education system. He (Scholtz: 2005) further sUbstantiates this fact by stating that as 
late as 1988, educational expenditure per white child was R22 769 per child, while 
educational expenditure per black child was R595. Inferior black education itself served 
to limit black participation in the economy. Therefore, the response of the government 
currently is to set out to establish equality through a multi-faceted BEE strategy. This 
strategy is supported by legislation, which includes the speCific legislation outlined 
below. 
2.4 The legal framework for black economic empowerment 
The following is a limited discussion of. a few of the recent legislative enactments which 
support black economic empowerment. The analysis is intended to give a broad 
overview of the legislative foundation which has been laid to assist black economic 
empowerment initiatives, particularly in the last ten years. The discussion is limited and 
is not meant to provide a thorough legal analysis of the legislation . It is only a broad 
overview of what the speCific legislation entails pertaining to black economic 
empowerment. 
2.4.1 The Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment Act, 53 of 2003 
The Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment Act (referred to as the BEE Act) was 
signed into law by the President of South Africa on 9 January 2004. In section 1, the 
BEE Act defines BEE as: 
An integrated and coherent socioeconomic process that directly contributes 
to the economic transformation of South Africa and brings about both 
significant increases in the number of black people that manage, own and 
control the country's economy as well as significant decreases in income 
inequalities. 
In addition, the BEE Act defines broad-based black economic empowerment as and 
outlines broad BEE objectives as the following ' : 
, Section 1 of the BEE Act 
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The economic empowerment of all black people including women, workers, youth, 
people with disabilities and people living in rural areas through diverse but 
integrated socioeconomic strategies that include, but are not limited to-
(a) Increasing the number of black people that manage, own and control 
enterprises and productive assets; 
(b) Facilitating ownership and management of enterprises and productive assets 
by communities, workers, cooperatives and other collective enterprises; 
(c) Human resource and skills development; 
(d) Achieving equitable representation in all occupational categories and levels in 
the workforce; 
(e) Preferential procurement; and 
(f) Investment in enterprises that are owned or managed by black people. 
The definition of broad-based black economic empowerment above, gives an expanded 
meaning to BEE. It extends its horizon to more than just a purchase of shares in an 
organization and the consequential dividends earned. This definition speaks of economic 
empowerment, implying a more sustainable and substantive way of redressing the 
predominant economic imbalances and inequality, which were brought about by the 
legacy of apartheid. This definition is also all encompassing, as it includes women, 
workers, youth, people with disabilities and people living in rural areas. 
Further, according to Scholtz (2005), the BEE Act does not itself directly prescribe the 
criteria governing preferential procurement and empowerment. The writer of this thesis 
agrees that what its framework does, instead, is to provide a legislative basis for the 
promulgation of such criteria under the guidance of the different advisory councils, some 
of which were appointed in terms of industry specific charters. 
The BEE Act makes provision for an Advisory Council and section 5 of the BEE Act 
outlines the following duties for the Advisory Council : 
(a) advise government on black economic empowerment; 
(b) review progress in achieving black economic empowerment; 
(c) advise on draft codes of practice, which the Minister intends publishing 
for comment in terms of Section 9(5) of the Act; 
(d) advise on the development and adaptation of a strategy for the pursuit of 
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broad-based black empowerment to be issued by the Minister; 
(e) advise on transformation charters; 
(f) facilitate the creation of public-private partnerships, which advance BEE 
objectives. 
Of the functions of the Council, the most vital is its role in advising on draft codes 
of practice and transformation charters. It is the codes of practice and 
transformation charters, which are to embody the specific criteria for preferential 
procurement. Sections 9 and 10 of the BEE Act determine the ambit and status of 
the codes of good practice. 
Section 9 of the Act enables the Minister, by notice in the Governrnent Gazette, to issue 
codes of good practice that may cover: 
(a) the further interpretation and definition of broad-based black economic 
empowerment; 
(b) criteria for preferential procurement; 
(c) indicators to measure broad-based black empowerment; 
(d) the weighting to be attached to broad-based black economic empowerment 
indicators; 
(e) guidelines for stakeholders in relevant sectors of the economy to draw up 
transformation charters for their sector; and 
(f) any other matter necessary to achieve the objectives of the Act. 
This section determines what may be covered in codes of good practice; while Section 
10 determines their status and obliges every organ of state and public entity to take into 
account, and, as far as is reasonable , to apply any relevant code of good practice issued 
under the Act in: 
(a) determining the qualification criteria for the issue of licences, concessions or other 
authorisations in terms of any law; 
(b) developing and implementing a preferential procurement policy; 
(c) determining qualification criteria for the sale of state-owned enterprises; and 
(d) developing criteria for entering into public-private partnerships. 
The Minister has recently issued and continues to update the draft codes of good 
practice (or 'statements'). To date, these centre on the introduction of a sophisticated 
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'balanced scorecard' approach to the determination of degrees of empowerment. The 
essence of that approach is to award a score to enterprises competing for government 
contracts, which measures not only the degree to which the enterprise is itself 
empowered, but also the extent to which the enterprise, in its own commercial relations, 
favours other empowered enterprises. 
2.4.2 The Employment Equity Act, 55 of 1998 
An in-depth analysis of the provisions of the Employment Equity Act (referred to as the 
EEA) is beyond the scope of this thesis. However it is important to highlight that the EEA 
provides for the formulation of affirmative action and other black economic 
empowerment policies which are implemented as necessary interventions to redress the 
systematic exclusion of most black South Africans from participating to their full potential 
in their economy. 
It is argued that the marginalisation of black people led to significant structural distortions 
in the economy. The EEA also prescribes compliance for all employers with more than 
fifty employees and also uses turnover thresholds which apply to different industry 
sectors. 
2.4.3 Skills Development Act, 97 of 1998 
According to Scholz (2005), the Skills Development Act sets out to provide a framework 
for workplace strategies to improve the national skills base. It established the so-called 
Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETA's), principally to oversee a system of 
workplace learnerships. 
Another important legislative instrument in this context is the Skills Development Levies 
Act, 9 of 1999. This legislation obliges employers to contribute one percent of their 
annual payroll towards the National Skills Fund. These funds are expended on training 
and development projects and are also refundable to employers to finance their own 
employee training activities. 
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2.4.4 Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act, 5 of 2000 
The Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act provides a framework within which 
preferential procurement policies for particularly government purchasing agencies would 
be formulated and implemented. It also provides for a preference point system to be 
followed in awarding contracts. However, it is argued that this legislation was to a 
significant extent overridden by the introduction of the BEE Act, which produced the 
much needed explicit criteria, in the implementation of preferential procurement pOlicies 
by government. 
2.5 The Financial Sector Charter 
One of the most important government and industry initiatives contributing to the 
furtherance of BEE has been the Financial Sector Charter (FSC). This charter has set 
out clear guidelines for achieving BEE targets. 
representatives signed the FSC in August 2003. 
Government and industry 
The FSC sets out a balanced scorecard against which BEE progress by companies 
within the industry can be measured. The balanced scorecard applies certain weightings 
to the each category of empowerment transactions as outlined in the financia l sector 
charter as depicted below; the total points on the charter add up to 100' . Although not an 
exact duplicate of the generic scorecard as produced by the Department of Trade and 
Industry, the FSC does represent the essential elements of the generic balanced 
scorecard. The FSC also contains three core elements which are direct empowerment, 
human resource development and indirect empowerment. For completeness, all the 
areas of measurable compliance have been outlined below. The expanded and defined 
areas of BEE compliance included below are the focus of this thesis. BEE compliance is 
measured in the following areas (FSC and Balanced Scorecard: 2003): 
Human resource development 
• Human resource development [20 points] 
The undertaking by each financial institution to promote a non-racial, non-sexist 
environment and to enhance cultural diversity and gender sensitivity within the 
sector; invest in human resource development across the full spectrum of skills, 
2 The Financial Sector Charter and the Balanced Scorecard (2003). 
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with special emphasis on increasing the participation of black people in skilled, 
strategic and operational leadership in the sector; invest in and equip current and 
future leadership incumbents in the sector with the appropriate knowledge and 
capacity to enable them to play a central role in driving the transformation 
programme. 
Indirect empowerment 
• Procurement and enterprise development 
• Corporate social investment 
• Access to financial services 
Direct empowerment 
• Empowerment financing 
[15 points] 
[3 points] 
[18 points] 
[22 points] 
The provision of finance for or investment in targeted investments and BEE 
transactions. Targeted investment means the debt financing or other form of 
credit extension or equity investments in South African projects in areas where 
gaps or backlogs in economic development and job creation have not been 
adequately addressed by financial institutions. The charter also defines BEE 
transactions as all transactions for the acquisition by black people of direct 
ownership in an existing or new entity in the financial or any other sector of the 
economy. 
• Ownership and control in the sector [22 points] 
The ownership of an equity interest, together with control over all of the voting 
rights attaching to that equity interest. 
As depicted above, each sub element has a weighting attached to it. As advised by 
Scholtz (2005), the weightings attached also indicate the maximum level of points 
available for the specific BEE element. 
According to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI website: 2005), a twenty-one 
member Charter Council, which is comprised of representatives from organized labour, 
industry and the government, regulates the charter. The Council is mandated to review 
ownership provisions in order to identify shortcomings and to make decisions on what 
further steps should be taken. These reviews are only due in 2009 and 2015; however 
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the Charter Council does give policy direction to the sector on a continuous basis. From 
a political perspective, the charter is not a definitive answer to the perceived 
transformation and other deficiencies in the sector. However, it does give a structured 
and clear framework within which the sector can work and measure its own progress. 
The focus of this thesis is based on three elements of the FSC balanced scorecard, 
being ownership and control, human resource development and empowerment 
financing . Chapter three and four contain the analysis of provisions which lend 
themselves to the furtherance of share purchase transactions and corporate 
restructuring rules . These provisions support the ownership and control objectives of the 
charter. The discussion in these chapters also covers the provisions which have been 
introduced to the Income Tax Act to support the purchase of shares by employees in 
terms of broad-based employee share schemes, and as such would contribute to the 
attainment of some of the goals envisaged under the human resource development sub-
element of the FSC. In addition, chapter four is dedicated to the discussion of the use of 
preference share funding structures which could enable the financial sector to attain the 
empowerment financing objectives set out by the financial sector industry charter. These 
three elements are important as they count for 64 points out of the FSC balanced 
scorecard weightings. 
There is a need to understand this background to BEE, as it constitutes an important 
foundation in order to analyse how tax and other financial instruments could facilitate the 
necessary process of transition in South Africa. BEE has been and continues to be an 
important tool used to transform South Africa's corporate and economic landscape into 
one more representative and inclusive of South Africa's population. It is in this context, 
that this otherwise political foundation is laid before the technical aspects of the Income 
Tax Act, which affect BEE transactions, are analysed. 
2.6 Tax and BEE 
Scholtz (2005: 13.1) argues that, "Tax is a Significant factor in the implementation of 
BEE transactions. It will play a role in determining how BEE participation is to be 
funded ... ". Notwithstanding that these tax exposures may be a significant obstacle to the 
implementation of arrangements intended to accommodate BEE partiCipants, to date 
very little change has been introduced into the Income Tax Act, which might be said to 
have been specifically introduced in order to facilitate BEE transactions. 
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The discussion which follows below includes an analysis of the taxation impact of the 
following provisions of the Income Tax Act: 
• Corporate restructuring rules 
Sections 41-47 
• Employee share acquisitions 
Sections 8B, 10(1 )(nC) and 11 (IA) 
• Debt transactions and inter-company loans 
Section 8(4)(m), section 20(1)(a)(ii) as well as paragraphs 12(5) and 56 of the 
Eighth Schedule. 
• Deferral of the accrual and incurral of share acquisition amounts 
Section 24N 
• Taxation of trust income 
Section 25B and the discussion on share acquisition trusts 
• Taxation of small business corporations and personal service companies 
Section 12E 
Paragraph 1 of the Fourth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 
• Preference shares and hybrid financial instruments as a means of funding 
Sections 8E and 8F 
• The general deduction formula and tax deductibility of interest expenditure 
Sections 11 (a), 23(g) and 23(f). 
2.6.1 Corporate restructuring rules 
Kolitz et al (2004) state that Part III of the Income Tax Act provides for tax relief in the 
form of deferrals and rollovers for qualifying company transactions and, provided the 
requirements of sections 41 to 47 are met, the negative tax implications of these 
transactions can be eliminated, minimised or deferred. The relief that these sections 
provide, could also be utilized for those BEE transactions, which meet the criteria 
contained in the said provisions. 
2.6.2 Employee share acquisition 
De Beer et al (2004) correctly note that one of the important focuses of the drive for BEE 
in South Africa, is the inclusion of previously disadvantaged employees in employee 
share ownership schemes, and this is also one of the facets of the FSC. 
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Looking at other countries for an example, it can be noted that in 2002 already, Zambia 
had promulgated specific tax legislation to encourage employers to issue share options 
to employees. In addition, according to De Beer et al (2004), the tax benefits to Zambian 
companies include the following: 
• The costs incurred by the company to set up and administer the scheme are tax 
deductible. 
• The income of the scheme is tax exempt. 
• The employer is exempt from Property Transfer Tax on shares transferred to the 
scheme. 
In addition, there are also benefits to the employees themselves, in that employees are 
exempt from tax on benefits arising from an approved scheme. One of the differences in 
tax legislation between South African and Zambia is that in Zambia, the growth in the 
value of the share options (between the market value at date of grant and at exercise 
date) is tax exempt at the date the shares are released to the employee. However, 
should the shares be sold, the employee will be taxed on the gain made, being the 
difference between the proceeds received and what was paid for the shares. De Beer et 
al (2004) point out that in South Africa tax is levied when the share options are exercised 
and capital gains tax (CGT) is paid on subsequent profits realized when the shares are 
sold. However, in Business Day (March 8, 2005) it was reported that new amendments 
to the Income Tax Act were being proposed and these would herald the first tentative 
move of the South African Revenue Service (SARS) to encourage the transfer of equity 
to previously disadvantaged individuals. 
De Beer et al (2004) further advises that where all the requirements of section 8B of the 
Income Tax Act are met, the following are essentially the new tax consequences on the 
disposal of shares held by an employee from an employer share option scheme: 
• The discount on the shares (upon release of the shares to the employee) will not be 
included in the income of the employee. 
• If the employee sells the shares within five years, the profit made on the sale will be 
included in the employee's taxable income in the ordinary way. 
• However, if the employee sells after the five-year period, the employee will be taxed 
on the capital gain, effectively reducing the applicable rate of tax. 
• The employer will, within some restrictions, be able to claim a tax deduction under 
new section 11 (IA). The deduction is an amount equal to the market value of shares, 
but limited to R3000 per participating employee in the year of issue of the shares, 
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with the excess being carried forward for deduction in ensuing years at a rate not 
more than R3000 per participating employee per year (up to a total of R9000 per 
employee). 
In tandem with the provisions of section 88 discussed above, sections 11 (IA) and 
10(1 )(nC) are discussed in more detail in chapter three. 
2.6.3 Debt transactions and inter-company loans 
It is important to note the possible impact of sections 8(4)(m) and 20(1 )(a)(ii), as well as 
paragraphs 12(5) and 56 of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act, on debt 
transactions and inter-company loans. Section 8(4)(m), which was introduced into the 
Act in 1997, states the following: 
• where as a result of the cancellation, termination or variation of an 
agreement or due to the prescription, waiver or release of a claim for 
payment; 
• any person was relieved or partially relieved from the obligation to make 
payment of any expenditure actually incurred; 
• and such expenditure or any allowance was not paid and was allowed as 
a deduction from such person's income; 
• such person shall be deemed to have recovered or recouped an amount 
equal to the amount of the obligation from which such person was 
relieved or partially relieved. 
This section only applies if the transaction giving rise to the debt was previously a 
deductible expense. It is also subject to the provisions of section 20(1 )(a)(ii), which in 
essence provides that the balance of any assessed loss shall be reduced by the value of 
any benefit received from a concession granted, or compromise with the creditors 
whereby liabilities have been reduced, provided such liabilities arose in the ordinary 
course of business. When the compromise benefit relates to a transaction of a capital 
nature, the provisions of paragraphs 12(5) and 56 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act 
apply to include the taxable gain in taxable income. These sections are discussed in 
more detail in chapter three. 
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2.6.4 Deferral of accrual and incurral of equity share acquisition amounts 
The provisions of a new section, section 24N of the Income Tax Act, defer both the 
inclusion in gross income and the deduction from income (in the case of expenditure), of 
amounts forming the subject of a disposal of an asset (section 24N provides specifically 
for the disposal of equity shares), which are not quantifiable in the year of assessment 
during which the asset is disposed. Such amounts will only accrue or rank for deduction 
in the year that they become quantifiable. 
Scholtz (2005) concedes that there is general consensus amongst some tax authors, 
that section 24N was introduced into the Income Tax Act to aid BEE transactions , this is 
in view of the fact that this provision effectively promotes the sale of shares 'on terms' by 
providing that instalments receivable in later years will only be caught as proceeds when 
the instalments become due and payable. 
2.6.5 Trusts and BEE structures 
Different types of trusts are also a common feature of BEE funding structures. This is 
mostly found where the interests of groups of people, such as employees and/or 
previously disadvantaged communities are to be represented . Furthermore there are 
also other legitimate business and strategic reasons for using trusts and these include 
family and estate planning, joint ventures, joint holdings of business assets, fiduciary 
arrangements, life-long care for physically and mentally handicapped, and so on. 
It is interesting to note that where the general public has an interest through the medium 
of a business trust structure, as is often the case within BEE structures, there is the 
potential confiict with the provisions of section 37 of the Unit Trust Control Act 54 of 1981 
(This Act was replaced by the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act, 2002), which 
provides that: 
No person shall do any act or enter into any agreement or transaction for the 
purpose of establishing, carrying on or managing any scheme, other than a 
Unit Trust Scheme .. . in terms of this Act, in pursuance of which members of 
the public are or will be invited or permitted for valuable consideration to 
acquire an interest or undivided share in an asset or one or more groups of 
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assets and to participate proportionately in the income or profits derived 
therefrom. 
Moreover, van Wyk (2003) justifiably submits that it is a well-known fact that SARS 
dislikes trusts and perceives them in general to be vehicles used for tax avoidance. A 
number anti-avoidance rules clearly have been devised to make the use of trusts less 
attractive, including taxing trusts (other than special trusts) at the marginal rate of 40 
percent compared with companies which are taxed at the rate of 29 percent and 
individuals taxed at the graduated tax rate structure of between 18 to 40 percent. In the 
context of BEE however, an aggressive tax regime for trusts seems very prejudicial and 
perhaps also unconstitutional. 
Trusts are often used as business vehicles3, to a certain extent because the major 
advantages vested in both the company and close corporation alternate business 
structures, for example, limited liability, can be enjoyed by using a trust less onerously in 
terms of expense and administrative hurdles. Moreover, trusts are not required by law to 
be audited (Estate Planning, Service Issue: Nov 2002). It has however been argued that 
in certain instances, and for the reason that the limited liability feature is obtained without 
the necessary protection for creditors, the maintenance of capital required by company 
law and the solvency and liquidity required by close corporation law, trust beneficiaries 
can therefore be exposed to prejudice caused by the lack of clear rules as contained in 
the trust deed for their protection. However, in assessing this potential hazard, Wunsh 
(1986: 561 at 563) said "I should point out that although business trusts provide scope 
for the avoidance and reduction of duties and taxes, despite the dangers adverted to by 
the Law Commission and the Standing Advisory Committee on Company Law, there is 
no evidence of prejudice to or losses by the public as the result of the use of trusts for 
business purposes." 
The main argument concerning this rather contentious structure is that although a trust is 
a taxable entity in terms of the Income Tax Act the income that accrues to or is received 
by the trust, will not always be taxed in the hands of the trust. This income might be 
taxed in the hands of the beneficiaries or the founder of the trust or a disponer. The most 
effective cause of the taxation of trust income in the hands of the founder of the trust or 
3 The fact that tax losses in a trust can no longer be passed through to the trust beneficiaries may 
make trading trusts less attractive. 
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disponer is the operation of the provisions of section 7, which are aimed at preventing 
income splitting. 
The most common use of trusts in the BEE context will occur in situations where the 
anti-avoidance provisions of section 7 will not be applicable, further assuming that the 
business trusts usually formed are residents of the Republic. This situation will therefore 
be governed by section 25B of the Act. This will be dealt with in some detail in chapter 
three. 
2.6.6 Taxation of small business corporations and personal service companies 
Section 12E of the Income Tax Act outlines the definition of the small business 
corporations which qualify for tax relief provided by the taxing acts to date. This is 
analysed as many of these small business corporations are black owned and managed 
and as such contribute to BEE. 
Further, the taxation of personal services companies has the effect that the taxation of 
these small, medium and micro enterprises, which are also often black owned 
operations, as "personal services companies" as defined , is that their entire income is 
subjected to employees tax. This results in 35 percent of gross receipts paid to them 
being withheld for the payment of PAVE, resulting in cash flow constraints for the small 
businesses. 
In addition, there is a limit on the level of deductions allowed for the determination of 
taxable income. Effectively only salaries paid to employees are allowed as a deduction. 
According to section 23(k) of the Income Tax Act, a personal services company may not 
deduct any expenses incurred, other than the amounts paid or payable to any employee 
of such company, for the purposes of determining the company's taxable income. The 
disallowing of the remainder of expenses (possibly a substantial percentage of total 
expenditure) incurred in the production of income for the type of trade in question, 
results in cash flow strains and an unequal tax burden on these small businesses. 
Further, it can be argued that these tax costs have made and could potentially make 
more of these operations technically insolvent and put them in a loss-making position for 
prolonged periods of time. 
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2.6.7 Preference shares and hybrid financial instruments as a means of funding 
As argued by Scholz (2005), a significant number of BEE transactions have featured the 
use of preference share capital in order to enable the BEE parties to obtain the 
necessary funding at more affordable rates. Jordaan et al (2005: 239) state that "the low 
cost of capital has made these preference-share deals advantageous". Zinman (2004) 
is of the opinion that preference shares have been available as a financing tool from the 
very origins of company law. 
The writer of this thesis concedes that the cost of financing the multi-billion obligations 
arising from most of the big BEE deals, coupled with the unfavourable tax treatment of 
interest expenditure on monies borrowed to purchase shares, have also encouraged the 
use of preference share funding. Chapter five of this thesis has been dedicated to a 
detailed investigation of section BE of the Income Tax Act which regulates the use of 
preference share funding and the consequential tax costs that may be applicable to 
BEE. The provisions of this section were introduced into the Act as an anti-avoidance 
measure to counter the prevalent use preference share funding schemes to disguise 
debt obligations as equity. 
Section BF has also been introduced into the Income Tax Act, its purpose being to limit 
the deduction from gross income of certain interest payments which were incurred under 
equity transactions disguised as debt. The main discussion in chapter five, however, is 
focused on the tax implications of section BE, both prior to and after the 26 October 2004 
amendments and how these could affect preference share funding structures and, 
ultimately, BEE funding. 
2.6.8 The general deduction formula and the deductibility of interest expenditure 
incurred on amounts raised to acquire shares 
Scholtz (2005) advises that one of the major impediments to increased share acquisition 
by black people is the refusal of the South African tax system to allow the deduction from 
income of interest expenditure incurred on loans raised in order to acquire shares. The 
provisions of section 11 (a), 23(g) and 23(f) which constitute the general deduction 
formula and as such govern the tax deductibil ity of interest expenditure, are analysed in 
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detail in chapter three, in order to highlight how the current format of the general 
deduction formula impedes the attainment of some of the objectives of black economic 
empowerment. 
2.7 Conclusion 
It is apparent from the discussion above, that there is some legislative foundation which 
has been established, particularly in the past ten years, to aid the implementation of BEE 
policies, especially in the financial sector. This has been illustrated by an analysis of 
some of the legislative enactments which have been introduced in the last ten years to 
support economic transformation. Additionally, there are a few provisions in the Income 
Tax Act which can be useful tools in promoting cost- efficiency in terms of the taxation of 
BEE transactions. There are , however, some sections of the Act which can be punitive in 
relation to the structuring of BEE transactions and their financing. 
Kolitz et al (2005) and Scholz (2005) agree that there is some relief which is available 
from the application of sections 41-47 of the Act which provide rollover and deferral of 
both income and/or capital gains tax for qualifying company formation transactions. The 
combination of sections BB, 10(1 }(nC), and 11 (IA) appear to provide a significant 
legislative contribution towards the promotion of share acquisitions by employees; this is 
supportive of the attainment of the goals of broad-based economic empowerment. 
Jordaan et al (2004) and Zinman (2004) concede that the use of preference share 
funding and the consequential taxation implications have been prevalent in large BEE 
transactions to date. Section BE of the Income Tax Act, however, serves to limit the 
willingness of financiers to subscribe for preference shares, as some of the dividend 
income earned could be deemed to be interest income and therefore taxable, if the 
requ irements of the section are satisfied. The following chapter investigates in more 
depth both the provisions of the Act which aid BEE and those which are punitive to these 
transactions. 
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Chapter 3: A discussion of certain taxation provisions and their impact on black 
economic empowerment 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters outlined certain facets of tax legislation regarding the transfer of 
assets that may not be particularly conducive to the process of structuring and financing 
BEE transactions. The opening discussion in this chapter is on the taxation of the 
transfer of assets within a group. This includes a brief discussion of the effects of the 
corporate restructuring rules of the Income Tax Act, contained in sections 41-47. In 
addition, an analysis of the taxation effects of inter-company loans is carried out. The 
analysis is done with a specific focus on sections 8(4)(m), 20(1 )(a)(ii) as well as 
paragraphs 12(5) and 56 of the Eighth Schedule, taking into account some aspects of 
the capital gains tax (CGT) legislation. 
There is also a discussion on the taxation of share acquisition schemes, based on the 
new sections 8B, 10(1 )(nC) and 11(IA) of the Income Tax Act. 
The chapter further includes an outline of the legislation governing the taxation of trust 
income and how this may affect BEE transactions. 
The chapter also briefly analyses the provisions of section 24N of the Act, a relatively 
new section, the effect of which is the deferral of tax on the sale and acquisition of equity 
shares, subject to some requirements contained in section 24N(2) of the Act. The 
discussion is centered on the usefulness of this section to BEE transactions. 
Lastly, a discussion of paragraph 1 of the Fourth Schedule to the Act is carried out, this 
is done in order to highlight a few taxation hurdles brought about by the taxation of 
personal service companies and how these could affect black-owned small , medium and 
micro enterprises. This discussion is preceded by a general analysis of the taxation of 
small business corporations as defined in section 12E of the Act. This is done in order to 
highlight the fact that although there are still significant areas of concern, a lot of work 
has been done by the government on targeted tax policy reforms which support small 
business corporations and black economic empowerment by implication. 
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3.2 Taxing the transfer of assets 
For the purposes of this thesis, the assets discussed are broadly defined to include 
property of whatever nature, whether movable or immovable, corporeal or incorporeal 
and a right or interest of whatever nature to or in such property. This definition is 
designed to be wide enough to cover any type of assets including fixed assets, 
intangibles or rights of use of any other asset or property. 
Tax legislation is currently designed to prevent excessive tax benefits being claimed by 
the movement of assets within a group. Hence, if assets are moved within the group, 
these assets are deemed to have been disposed of at their market values. The said 
transference can result in both income tax and capital gains tax under the Income Tax 
Act. At this point it is also important to note that "There is no separate capital gains tax 
(CGT) in South Africa. A person's taxable capital gain for a year of assessment is 
included in his taxable income and subject to normal tax ... this means that taxable capital 
gains are subject to normal tax rather than a separate CGT" (Silke, 2002:546). 
Scholtz (2005) defines the corporate restructuring rules as essentially rollover relief 
rules, which govern the transfer of assets to, or between companies. When groups of 
companies are restructured for good commercial or corporate-political reasons, as it 
inherently is in the case of BEE structures, some rationalization rules have been 
incorporated into the current legislation. As outlined in chapter two, these rules are 
contained in sections 41-47 of the Act. The focus of the discussion in this chapter, 
however, is limited to sections 42, 43, 44 and 45 of the Act as it is considered that these 
sections are arguably the most relevant to the types of BEE transactions envisaged in 
this thesis. Adapted from the analysis by Koliz et al (2004), the provisions of sections 41 
to 47 are summarised below: 
• Section 41 sets out the definitions of terms used in sections 42 to 47 and defines the 
scope of these sections. 
• Section 42 provides for the deferral of income tax and capital gains tax (CGT) arising 
from company formation transactions in respect of which a person disposes of an asset 
to a company in eXChange for shares in that company. 
• Section 43 provides for the deferral of income tax and CGT arising from share-for-
share transactions in respect of which a person disposes of an equity share in one 
company (the target company) to another company (the acquiring company) in 
exchange for shares in the acquiring company. 
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• Section 44 provides for tax concessions which defer the taxation of certain 
recoupments arising from amalgamation transactions in terms of which a company 
disposes of all of its assets to another company and, following the disposal, existence of 
the first company is terminated. 
• Section 45 provides for the deferral of income tax and CGT arising from intra-group 
transactions in terms of which an asset is disposed of by one company to another and 
both companies form part of the same group of companies. 
• Section 46 provides for the deferral of income tax and CGT arising from unbundling 
transactions in terms of which a company disposes of equity shares to its shareholders. 
• Section 47 provides for the deferral of income tax and CGT arising upon the 
liquidation, winding-up or deregistration of a company. 
Section 42 of the Income Tax Act, which governs "company formations", applies where 
assets are transferred to a company against an issue of shares. The primary 
requirement is that the transferor company must acquire more than 25 percent of the 
equity interest in the transferee company. For the purposes of this thesis and in the 
context of BEE, a transferee company may be set up and assets transferred to it before 
selling a stake in that company to a BEE participant. The BEE participant might also 
form a company itself and transfer some assets in return for an issue of shares. These 
parties may then invoke section 42 to ensure that the assets are transferred free of the 
adverse tax and CGT consequences. Importantly, as provided in Huxham et al (2004: 
258) " ... the section only applies to the extent that the parties agree that a transaction 
must be dealt with as a company formation transaction". 
Another aspect of the corporate restructuring rules which might be relevant in black 
economic empowerment transactions is section 43, which governs share-for-share 
transactions. Huxham et al (2004: 262) define these as 
" .... transactions in terms of which any person (other than a trust which is not 
a special trust) disposes of any equity share (the target share) in a company 
(the target company) to a South African resident company (the acquiring 
company) in exchange for any equity share in that acquiring company (and 
the market value of the equity share disposed of is more than its base cost, if 
a capital asset, or more than its tax value, if it is trading stock). If the 
requirements of this section are fulfilled and the election is not made or 
cannot be made (as an election can only be made in the case of both parties 
being part of the same group of companies), the provisions of this section 
apply automatically". 
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Generally, where the provisions of this section apply, Huxham et al (2004: 263) state 
that " .. the transferor is deemed to have sold the shares (if they are not trading stock) at 
his base cost and he is deemed to have acquired the shares in the acquiring company at 
the same base cost". This is contained in section 43(2). However, if shares are held in 
the target company as trading stock, the transferor is deemed to have disposed of them 
at their tax value in terms of section 22(1) and he is deemed to have acquired the shares 
in the acquiring company at the same value (Huxham et al :2004). Most BEE 
transactions feature the use of share-for-share transactions, for example, a large 
multinational group might want to purchase a stake in a small BEE distribution company. 
In view of the benefits for both companies in owning each other's shares , they may elect 
to have a share-for-share transaction. Provided that the conditions of section 43 are met, 
there are Significant CGT savings on these transactions, and this is most welcome for 
BEE transactions at large. 
Section 44 of the corporate restructuring rules governs company amalgamations as 
contemplated in section 44(1). Huxham et al (2004) assert that according to this section, 
in amalgamation transactions the 'amalgamated company' disposes of all of its assets to 
the 'resultant company' and as a result of the amalgamation, the amalgamated company 
ceases to exist. This section is not subject to an election in order to apply, unless the 
parties to the amalgamation are group companies. Section 44(13) stipulates that the 
amalgamated company must take steps to liquidate or deregister within six months from 
the date of the amalgamation transaction. In a BEE scenario, where the companies often 
do not possess any meaningful assets except for the shares in issue, should a BEE 
company decide to dispose its own shares in return for shares in the resultant company, 
Huxham et al (2004) state that according to section 44(6), if as a result of the share 
exchange a profit is made over and above the base cost or tax value, then the share 
acquisition and disposal are for the same amount. This may be base cost or tax value, 
depending on what the parties choose in the particular situation. This transference would 
therefore be effectively tax free. However, it is important to note that where the resultant 
company subsequently disposes of some of the assets acquired under an amalgamation 
transaction within 18 months from the date of the amalgamation transaction, a portion of 
the tax savings might be lost, triggering significant capital gains tax in some instances. 
This is provided by section 44(5) which acts as an anti-avoidance provision of the 
section . 
One of the general requirements relating to the corporate rules of the Act, is that the 
holding company must, after the restructuring (which may involve the transfer of assets), 
32 
U ••• remain a 75 percent shareholder of the company to which the assets have been 
transferred" Silke (2002: 351). As an example, 
A large listed group enters into an agreement with BEE partners to enable 
them to acquire a significant equity stake in a large and profitable division of 
the group. To achieve this , a new company is formed in which the group and 
the partners hold equity stakes, and the relevant assets (including goodwill) 
are transferred to the new company. If the market values of the assets are 
much higher than the values for tax purposes, either or both income tax and 
CGT will be payable if the group does not continue to hold at least 75 
percent of the new company (Mazansky: 2003). 
Put another way, assets may only be transferred within the group where the companies' 
equity share capital is held within the group to the extent of at least 75 percent. The real 
effect of this rule is that unless companies have budgeted for all these underlying tax 
costs or up-front tax liabilities, the maximum the group can offer to BEE partners is a 25 
percent share holding. If assets are initially transferred within the group, should there be 
an understanding between the BEE partners and their group of companies that they will 
increase their share holding to a percentage greater than 25 percent at an agreed point 
in time after the initial acquisition of the 25 percent stake, because of section 45(2) of the 
Act, such transfer is deemed to have occurred at base cost, and is hence effectively tax-
free. Section 45 contains the provisions which relate to intra-group transactions. Huxham 
et al (2004: 269) define these transactions as " ... transactions in terms of which any 
asset is disposed of by one company (the transferor company) to another company 
which is a resident (the transferee company) and both companies form part of the same 
group of companies on the date of the transaction". Taxpayer companies may elect the 
application of the provisions of this section on an asset-by-asset basis. 
As previously stated, in terms of an intra-group transaction , if the group's shareholding is 
later diluted to less than 75 percent, any further transference or disposal is deemed to 
have occurred at market values of the assets in question on the date of the initial (25 
percent) transaction. If a holding company, for example, sells a further 10 percent to the 
BEE partners in the example above, there is an immediate tax liability arising from the 
difference between the base cost or tax value and the market value of the assets being 
disposed of. 
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However, according to Mashigo (2005) of the National Treasury, in the 2005 Budget, 
amendments were announced for the current corporate restructuring rules, which 
provide more relief for company formations and restructurings , and which in turn 
facili tate black economic empowerment deals. These amendments refine critical policy 
areas, especially the impact of capital gains tax on company formations and 
restructurings. The 75 percent shareholder threshold has now been relaxed to a 70 
percent direct or indirect holding, making the tax relief provisions more accessible. The 
new definition of "group of companies" will allow up to 30 percent to be transferred to an 
empowerment consortium, and this accommodates all black economic empowerment 
charters. 
In addition, under the current tax legislation as discussed above, companies disposing of 
assets in exchange for shares (such as in an empowerment transaction) have to take 25 
percent in equity in the new company to qualify for tax-free company formation relief. 
The BEE partner is also liable for capital gains tax on any shareholding of less than 25 
percent. These current rules impede empowerment transactions because transactions 
may involve more than one company in the transaction, yet with a stake of less than 25 
percent they will not be able to claim the relief. This hinders company formations when 
multiple parties seek to form a company. The 25 percent threshold has now been 
reduced, thus allowing companies to dispose of less than 25 percent of their shares in a 
restructuring and still claim the tax relief. 
These amendments allow for wider application of the relief provisions. Although the 
amendments facilitate company restructuring in general, specifically, they facilitate 
empowerment deals such as intra-group transactions, where assets are disposed of by 
one company to another entity and more than a 25 (now 30) percent share of such entity 
is transferred to the empowerment consortium. However, it is important to note that 
complying with the requirements of the corporate restructuring rules is not an easy 
matter. The sophistication of these rules, may to a significant extent dilute the inherent 
benefits that some of these rules may provide for BEE transactions. As such, there is a 
need to consider simplified legislation in order to support company reorganisations which 
include the attainment of black economic empowerment objectives. This would also 
augur well for increased tax compliance. 
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3.3 Share incentive schemes 
The recently introduced section 88, introduced by the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 
2004, addresses the adverse tax consequences which normally arose with the issue of 
shares to employees at a discount. Issuing shares to employees at a reduced cost or for 
no consideration tended to trigger "fringe benefit" tax, which many employees could not 
afford because of the adverse cash flow consequences of having to pay the tax. 
According to paragraph 2(a) of the Seventh Schedule to the Act, as discussed in 
Huxham et al (2004), there is a taxable benefit which arises when an asset has been 
acquired by an employee from his/her employer for less than the determined value (as 
provided in paragraph (5) of the Seventh Schedule). The taxable benefit is the difference 
between what the employee has actually paid and the determined value. In the context 
of the acquisition of shares, apart from the provisions of section 8A which govern share 
options predominantly acquired by directors, the value in question for the purposes of 
this discussion would be the market value of the shares at the time when the employee 
acquired the shares. This difference would have triggered fringe benefit tax even in the 
case of employee share schemes for 8EE, prior to the introduction of section 88. 
Section 88 provides that, in prescribed circumstances, the discount on the issue price 
shall not give rise to a taxable benefit in the hands of the employee and the issuing 
company may under certain circumstances claim a deduction in respect to the issue of 
shares. This section also provides for the taxation of any amounts received or accrued to 
employees from the disposal of 'qualifying' equity shares acquired in terms of a broad-
based employee share plan. Mitchell et al (2005) advise that section 88 effectively 
allows for the tax free treatment of 'qualifying equity share(s)' acquired by employees, 
even though the shares may have been acquired at a discount or without cost. Adapted 
from the discussion by Scholtz (2005), the preconditions for the application of section 88 
are as follows: 
The employee share plan must be a broad based employee share plan. In terms of 
section 88, this only means that the plan must be open for participation to at least 
90 percent of all permanent employees who have worked for the company in 
question on a full-time basis for at least one year and are not shareholders of the 
company in terms of any other employee share scheme. Secondly, the 
consideration attached to the issue of the shares must not exceed the minimum 
requirement set by the Companies Act, 61 of 1973. Thirdly, the employees who 
are shareholders in terms of the scheme must be entitled to all dividends and full 
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voting rights with respect to their shares. Where the requirements of this section 
are satisfied, then the discount on the shares will not be included in the taxable 
income of the employee. 
In this context, in terms of section 10(1)(nC), any amount received by or accrued to a 
taxpayer who is a natural person, in the form of a qualifying equity share contemplated in 
section 8B is exempted from taxation. These provisions were introduced by the Revenue 
Laws Amendment Act, 2004 (26 October 2004) and apply to any qualifying equity share 
received or accrued on or after that date. In addition, in the past the company issuing the 
shares at a discount would not qualify for tax deduction for the issue, as the discount 
does not represent a cost "actually incurred" by the company. This has now been 
rectified by the provisions of section 11 (lA), which allows a deduction for an employer 
who introduces a 'broad-based employee share plan' as contemplated in section 8B(1) 
for its employees. It allows as a tax deduction an amount as paraphrased in the 
paragraph below: 
An amount equal to the market value of any qualifying equity share granted 
to an employee as contemplated in section 8B, as determined on the date of 
grant as defined in section 8B, which applies in lieu of any other deduction 
which may otherwise be allowed to that taxpayer or any other person in 
respect of the granting of that share: Provided that the deduction under this 
paragraph may not during any year of assessment in aggregate exceed 
R3 000 in respect of all qualifying equity shares granted to a single employee 
and so much as exceeds R3 000 may be carried forward to the immediately 
succeeding year of assessment. 
Although it is considered that there are still restrictions, especially in terms of 
section 8B, which still pose a challenge to the furtherance of BEE objectives in the 
sphere of broad-based employee share acquisitions, these sections combined 
provide a fair contribution from the tax legislation to promote the acquisition of 
shares by employees and as such contribute to the attainment of some of the 
objectives of the BEE Act. One such restriction is the fact that, in terms of section 
8B(1), employees who dispose of the shares within five years of their having been 
granted, will be taxed on the amount accruing from the disposal. 
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3.4 Debt transactions and inter-company loans 
In addition to the fact that BEE companies may be saddled with up-front tax costs and 
other indirect tax liabilities, they are more often than not also burdened with very high 
debt service obligations. Some of these may be inter-group but most liabilities would 
stem from external parties, for example the formal financial sector. The discussion below 
represents an adaptation specifically incorporated to discuss inter-company borrowings. 
It is customary for holding companies, or cross-company subsidiaries, to lend funds to 
each other on an ad hoc basis. This is mostly true for BEE structures, where normally a 
new company would be formed to accommodate empowerment partners or a particular 
empowerment deal. The new company may require some form of funding from the 
holding company or other fellow subsidiaries until it becomes profitable in its own right 
and engages in a repayment agreement. Because of varying circumstances or other 
business imperatives, the form of funding may change from debt to equity or the holding 
company may decide to write off the debt of the subsidiary without even considering the 
resulting tax consequences of its actions. 
Consideration needs to be given to the possible impact of sections 8(4)(m), 20(1)(a)(ii) 
as well as paragraphs 12(5) and 56 of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act on the 
fore-mentioned policy decisions. 
Section 8(4)(m), which was introduced into the Act in 1997, states that': 
• where as a result of the cancellation, termination or variation of an 
agreement or due to the prescription, waiver or release of a claim for 
payment; 
• any person was relieved or partially relieved from the obligation to make 
payment of any expenditure actually incurred; 
• and such expenditure or any allowance was not paid and was allowed as 
a deduction from such person's income; 
• such person shall be deemed to have recovered or recouped an amount 
equal to the amount of the obligation from which such person was 
relieved or partially relieved. 
4 Section 8(4)(m) of the Income Tax Act, 1962 
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This sectionS only applies if the transaction giving rise to the debt was previously a tax 
deductible expense. It is also subject to the provisions of section 20(1 )(a)(ii) which, in 
essence, provide that the balance of any assessed loss shall be reduced by the value of 
any benefit received from a concession granted, or compromise with the creditors 
whereby liabilities have been reduced, provided such liabilities arose in the ordinary 
course of business. 
As mentioned in chapter one, in the case of Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Datakor 
Engineering (Pty) Ltd. [1998] 4 All SA 414 (A), 57 SATC 178, the conversion of debt into 
equity, which resulted in a reduction of an assessed loss for tax purposes, was found to 
be a definite compromise. Notwithstanding controversy on the effect of this judgement, 
it remains important legal precedent in debt conversion transactions. Moreover, it will 
mostly govern such transactions and/or conversions and inter-company debt write-offs 
for BEE structures as well. 
In addition, in company formation transactions6, taxpayers may want to transfer property, 
subject to previously existing debt, at no cost or at a discount, thereby creating debt 
relief for the transferor. This form of debt relief, strictly speaking, should trigger part-
disposal treatment under section 8(4)(m) (discussed above). In practical terms, this part-
treatment would undo the main intent of making company formations tax-free.' 
Additionally, Huxham et al (2004: 199) stipulate that according to section 20(1)(a)(ii) of 
the Act: 
The balance of assessed loss shall be reduced by the amount or value of 
any benefit received by or accruing to a person resulting from a concession 
granted by or a compromise made with his creditors whereby his liabilities to 
them have been reduced or extinguished , provided such liabilities arose in 
the ordinary course of trade. 
Huxham et al (2004: 200) provide an explanation of the above statement by way of the 
following example: 
Z.l. Ltd has a balance of assessed loss as at 31 December 2003 of R50 000. 
For the year ended 31 December 2004 the company has gross income of R500 
000 and deductible expenses of R480 000. During the 2004 year the company 
5 See Note 5 
, See discussion of sections 42 and 44 on pages 30-31 
7 Amendment of section 38 of the Income Tax Act, 1962 
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enters into a compromise with its creditors in terms of which it derives a benefit 
of R40 000. The tax effect for the 2004 year is as follows: 
Gross income 
Expenses 
R500 000 
(R480 000) 
Assessed loss brought forward (from 2003) (R 50 000) 
Balance of assessed loss (R 30 000l 
The R30 000 is the balance which must be reduced by the compromise of R40 
000. The balance of the assessed loss carried forward is nil. The R10 000 of 
the compromise benefit not absorbed by the assessed loss is not carried 
forward. 
However, since section 8(4)(m) is subject to section 20, Huxham et al (2004) argue that 
section 8(4)m cannot apply if section 20 applies. The rationale is that the benefit 
provided by section 20 would be diminished by the recoupment triggered by section 
8(4)(m) which would reduce the balance of the assessed loss at the end of the year. 
With the introduction of Capital Gains Tax (CGT) on 1 October 2001 , paragraph 12(5) 
was introduced into the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act, which has the effect that 
any write-off of a loan, which is not subject to section 8(4)(m) will have CGT 
consequences for the debtor or borrower. When a holding company writes off the debt 
of a subsidiary, any excess not caught under the provisions of section 20(1 )(a)(ii), may 
be subject to CGT. This will apply if the transactions giving rise to the debt were not 
included in the holding company's income (and were therefore of a capital nature). The 
subsidiary company will be taxed on the capital gain made when the loan is written off. 
Assuming that the subsidiary company is a BEE company, it would then be burdened 
with the CGT liability that the debt relief passively introduces, although in essence it 
would still be better off. The holding company may only claim the corresponding capital 
loss if the subsidiary company includes the loan write-off in its taxable income 
(paragraph 56), provided also that the holding company itself has a capital gain against 
which such capital loss may be utilised. 
3.5 Amounts incurred or accrued from the disposal of equity shares 
Another section which is relevant in the context of BEE is the new section 24N. This 
section was introduced into the Income Tax Act by the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 
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2004 and was effective from 1 January 2005. What this section effects is the deferment 
of the taxation, particularly CGT, on the full purchase price of shares, to a later time 
period when the amount accrued is actually due and payable. However, this section is 
only applicable if the requirements of section 24N(2) are met. McFadden (2005) advises 
that the requirements of section 24N(2) can be summarised as follows: 
• more than 25 percent of the purchase price becomes due and payable after 
the end of the current year of assessment in question; 
• the amount of the purchase price payable is based on the future profits of the 
company; 
• the seller and the purchaser are not connected persons in relation to each 
other as defined; 
• the purchaser is obligated to return the shares to the seller if the purchaser 
defaults on the payment for any of the shares in question; 
• the amount must not be payable to the seller on the back of a financial 
instrument that is tradable in the open market; and 
• the value of the shares, which have been disposed of as part of the 
transaction, must exceed 25 percent of the total value of the shares in issue 
in the company. 
If and when the above-mentioned requirements are met, any amount which is not due to 
the seller of the shares in the current year of assessment, is deemed to have accrued to 
the seller only in the year of assessment in which it becomes due and payable. 
Essentially, the section allows a taxpayer to sell a meaningful shareholding in a 
company without being subject to immediate taxation if substantial payment proceeds 
are deferred until a later year. It therefore promotes seller self-financing. 
Although it is considered that some of the provisions of this section may be limiting, the 
section does provide a way around the general provisions contained in paragraph 35 of 
Schedule 8, which have the effect of including in gross income amounts which accrue to 
taxpayers in terms of asset disposal transactions and therefore subjects such amounts 
to CGT by including the amounts in the taxable income on the year that the asset was 
disposed of, if the payment which accrues to the taxpayer in a later year(s) is not 
conditional. The problem associated with this section is the provision that the seller and 
purchaser may not be connected persons, after the disposal of the shares. Section 24N 
in turn, may have a positive bearing on certain BEE transactions, as it allows the 
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disposal of shares to BEE parties with payment of the amount owing in respect of the 
shares arranged in instalments, without the upfront tax costs on such a disposal. 
3.6 Taxation of trust income 
Also relevant to the analysis of the tax consequences of BEE transactions, is a 
discussion of the tax dispensation relating to South African trusts. Section 25B of the Act 
provides that any income received by or accrued to or in favour of a trustee of a trust, 
whether testamentary or inter vivos, shall, subject to the provisions of section 7, be 
deemed to be income accrued to the beneficiary, if the income has been derived for the 
immediate or future benefit of an ascertained beneficiary who enjoys a vested right to 
such income. Where these conditions are not met the income is deemed to be the 
income of the trust. 
Furthermore, section 25B (3)' stipulates that, in determining any allowance or deduction 
attributable to the taxable income of any trust beneficiary, to the extent that trust income 
has accrued to or is received by such benefiCiary, the said deduction or allowance will be 
deemed to be a deduction or allowance which originally could be made in the 
determination of the taxable income of such a beneficiary according the Income Tax Act. 
Interesting to note is the fact that in South Africa, most beneficiaries from designated 
groups and previously disadvantaged communities will not legally arrange for their heirs 
to be entitled to their share of trust income should that income be distributed after the 
occurrence of an event like death. This is caused partially by the lack of access to 
information, and partially the existing low levels of literacy. The result therefore is that 
the benefiCiary would cease to have a vested right to such income and the income would 
then be deemed to be trust income, taxable in the hands of the trust. 
Trusts are taxed at the flat rate of 40 percent which would invariably be a rate higher 
than the tax rates applicable to the majority of the beneficiaries the trust would be 
representing from designated groups or previously disadvantaged communities. 
In 2001 SARS enacted amendments to section 25B of the Income Tax Act the effect of 
which was that trust income may be still be distributed amongst beneficiaries, but that 
expenditure may not be distributed in the same way. The application of this section was 
to a greater extent dependent on the wording of the trust deed. 
• It is important to note that section 25(2), which deals with deductions applicable to income 
derived from deceased estates, refers to the deduction of "expenditure", whereas section 25B(3} 
refers only to "allowances or deductions". 
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According to Van Wyk (2003), the trusts affected by this amendment had as 
beneficiaries persons dependent on income receivable from such a trust and resulted in 
such beneficiaries paying more tax than was previously the case. This lead to various 
submissions being made to SARS in this regard and eventually the amendments were 
withdrawn during the latter part of 2001. The original purpose for SARS effecting the 
amendments to section 25B was probably to avoid a perceived abuse of trusts in the 
income tax environment. In fairness to SARS, trusts are often used in structured finance 
and special projects where tax planning plays a major role in the transaction. 
In addition, it is probably for this reason that SARS introduced the revised 2001/2002 
version of income tax returns, which stipulate, in the corporate tax returns, that 
taxpayers must disclose in as far as they were involved, participated or advised (or both) 
in any structured finance deal during the year of assessment applicable for their tax 
returns. 
The nature of trust income in the hands of a beneficiary also warrants discussion. This 
principle has also been dealt with Significantly in case law." When a trust benefiCiary is 
taxed on trust income, the income retains its nature'O The trust only acts as a conduit 
and therefore, if the income receivable by the beneficiary is dividend income or interest 
income as the case may be, it retains its nature in the hands of the beneficiary. 
The taxation of the transfer of assets has already been dealt with in the preceding 
section. It is, however, relevant to this section to mention that the advantages of the 
restructuring rules 11 are not applicable to trust structures. If, for example, the BEE 
partners who hold shares in an operating subsidiary of a listed holding company want to 
exchange their shares for shares in the listed holding company, such transfer may result 
in CGT. A concession may be granted with the effect that such CGT will be only payable 
on the ultimate sale of the listed shares by the BEE partners. This corporate 
restructuring concession concession is, however, not granted when the shareholder 
(BEE partner) is a trust. 
This, once again, reflects the attitude that SARS has adopted in looking at the formation 
and subsequent taxation of trust structures. Also important to note, relating to this 
9 Armstrong v CIR 1938 AD 343; SIR v Rosen 1971 (1) SA 172 (A) 
10 Wunsh in SALJ 1986 at 561: Business Trusts in South Africa. 
11 See discussion of sections 41-47 in chapter three. 
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structure, is that there is no knowledge base developed on the subject of business 
trusts, particularly as they relate to BEE. 
In addition, and relevant to the use of business trusts in the South African BEE context, 
is the formation of trusts with undetermined beneficiaries and/or beneficiaries who are 
only indicated as a class or group. Many trusts will be formed on this basis to represent 
a group of employees from designated groups, communities, or undetermined 
beneficiaries at the time of the formation, as part of a broader BEE transaction. This 
concept was dealt with in the case of Pretorius v Commissioner for Inland Revenue, 
1984(2), SA 619(T), where Judge Le Roux delivered the judgment and concerning this 
issue said: "I can find no objection in principle with the trusts at the last mentioned 
provision and beneficiaries designated by a class description are often found in trust 
law ... ,,12. This principle is also said to have arisen in the case of Unit Trusts, as regulated 
by the Unit Trust Control Act of 1947, with an inherent feature that at inception, 
beneficiaries are often unknown. The income of this type of trusts therefore would be 
subject to the marginal tax rate of 40 percent and as such adversely affect the income 
available for beneficiaries when they are determined. 
Share-purchase trusts are also a common phenomenon encountered in BEE structures, 
especially in the employer-employee funding structures. A leading case on share-
purchase trusts is the case of CIR v Pick 'n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust, 54 
SATC 271, 1992 (A). This is discussed here in view of the relevance of the principles 
that it established, and its fairly recent nature. The contention in this case was in relation 
to the profits generated by the employee share purchase trust on disposal of certain 
shares. 
The trust in question was formed by a group of companies pursuant to provisions of 
section 38(2)(b) of the Companies Act 61, of 1973, to administer a share purchase 
scheme for the benefit of employees of the group. The trust contended that that 
proceeds arising upon disposal by it of shares in question constituted amounts of a 
capital nature excluded from gross income as defined in section 1 of the Income Tax 
Act. The trust further contended that it was created and maintained to enable employees 
to purchase shares in their employer company and that it did not acquire shares with the 
intention of reselling them at a profit in a scheme of profit making. 
12 (Also see Honore' SA Law of Trusts 2"' edition at 393) 
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Regarding the continuous dealing in shares by the trust, in giving the judgment, Judge 
Smalberger stated as follows: 
Irrespective of the number of transactions, whether the receipts that flowed 
from the carrying on of a business were revenue, still depended upon 
whether the business was conducted with a profit making purpose, i.e. as 
part of a profit-making venture or scheme. To hold otherwise would be a 
departure from the earlier authorities. While a profit motive is not essential 
for the carrying on of a business, its presence or absence is an important 
factor in determining whether a business is being conducted. Whether the 
trust was carrying on a business by trading in shares must be determined 
applying ordinary common sense and business standards. The court holds 
that on a common sense approach the trust was not carrying on a business 
by trading in shares for profit. 
Further that it was not the intention (purpose) of either the company in 
founding the Trust or the trustees in conducting the affairs of the trust to 
carry on business by trading in shares for profit in a profit making scheme. 
Accordingly the unsold shares held by the trust from time to time did not 
constitute floating capital. Where no trade is conducted there cannot be 
floating capital. 
The sale purpose of acquiring, holding and selling the shares was to place 
them in the hands of eligible employees" .accordingly any receipts accruing 
to the Trust from the sale of shares were not intended or worked for but 
purely fortuitous in the sense of being an incidental by-product. They were 
therefore non-revenue being accruals of a capital nature falling outside the 
definition of 'gross income' in section 1 of the Act and therefore not subject to 
tax. 
The most important principles that form the basis of the finding in this case, are the 
emphasis on intention, the original purpose and the continuous or recurring actions that 
support this original intention. The importance of the matter is not only the intention at 
the inception, or as set out in the founding statement in this case, but it is apparent from 
the case above that for the court to justifiably hold that there was no trading per se, and 
that the shares were not trading stock and most importantly, that the profits made were 
"purely fortuitous", the taxpayer must prove that the original non-profit motive was 
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supported by the recurring actions of the taxpayer in "conducting the affairs" of the trust. 
This is important for trusts that are formed to hold shares for BEE employee share 
schemes, for example, to be cognizant of the importance of outlining the original 
intention of holding such shares and being able to prove that the subsequent 
transactions engaged in were not divergent from the original purposes of forming the 
trust. 
In as much as the Commissioner does not particularly like these trust structures, their 
tax efficiency and usefulness in representing the interests of the masses, people from 
different classes and even beneficiaries unidentifiable at inception is problematical. The 
effect of section 25B and the supporting case law in respect of the taxation of income in 
beneficiaries' hands, which is especially relevant to discretionary trusts and the conduit 
principles discussed here, are the main reason this discussion is included in this chapter 
as these can prove to be useful and vital in the advancing of BEE funding structures. As 
previously asserted, trusts can be used to accommodate the interests of groups of 
people, employees and so on and, as such, they may have an important role to play in 
BEE funding structures and transactions. 
3.7 The tax implications of small business corporations ("SBCs") 
3.7.1 Definition 
Section 12E of the Act defines a small business corporation as: 
a close corporation or private company (not an employment company as 
defined); 
the entire shareholding of which is at all times during the year of assessment 
held by shareholders or members that are natural persons; 
the gross income for the year of assessment does not exceed R6 million; 
none of the shareholders or members at any time during the year of 
assessment of the company or close corporation holds any shares or has any 
interest in the equity of any other company as defined in section 1, other than 
a company contemplated in paragraph (e) of the definition of "l isted 
company"; 
not more than 20 percent of the total of all receipts and accruals (other than 
those of a capital nature) and all the capital gains of the company or close 
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corporation consists collectively of investment income and income from the 
rendering of a personal service; ... 
It is estimated that SBCs contribute to some degree of wealth creation for the 
entrepreneurs through the ownership of capital assets and to an extent, some form of 
economic empowerment in terms of independent employment of capital assets and 
importantly, skills transference. To this end, the development and continued support of 
small, medium and micro enterprises is a significant contributor to the achievement of 
the broader economic objectives. Thus, there is a role to be played by both government 
and the private sector in ensuring that the support given in this regard is adequately 
rewarded and/or provided with meaningful incentives. 
To an extent, the creation and continued support of SBCs contributes to the attainment 
of the ideals enshrined in the BEE Act and is therefore to be seen as an instrument of 
broad based black economic empowerment. A growing number of small business 
owners are black South Africans. 
3.7.2 Macroeconomic implications 
It is argued that SBCs have resulted in improvements in terms of productivity. This is 
said to be a function of the owners being motivated by purchasing their own capital 
assets and operating these for their own account. Furthermore on a medium to long-
term basis, the returns on capital investment are enhanced as small business owners 
acquire the necessary skills base, become familiar with the industry risks and acquire 
increased capital assets. 
In addition, other economic benefits derived from the establishment of sustainable SBCs 
include enabling employment creation, economic independence and exposure to more 
business opportunities drawing from both commercial incorporation and improved levels 
of expertise. These operations should be supported and enhanced for further 
sustainable growth opportunities. 
3.7.3 The general tax treatment of small business corporations 
In his annual budget speech in 2005, the Minister of Finance announced comprehensive 
tax measures aimed at the support of small, medium and micro enterprises. One such 
measure was the incorporation of certain personal service companies into the category 
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of small businesses which are eligible for the relief granted by the Act, provided that 
these businesses maintained at least four employees for core operations. 
Additionally, according to the National Treasury's Budget Review (2005: 86), the 
threshold turnover limit of small businesses eligible for relief was increased from R5 
million to R6 million effect from 1 April 2005. Moreover, the qualifying small businesses 
referred to, were from 1 April 2005 subject to the following graduated tax rate structure: 
RO - R35 000 of taxable income 
R35 001 - R250 000 
R250001+ 
o percent 
10 percent 
29 percent 
Qualifying small businesses are also eligible for a depreciation write-off at a 50:30:20 
percent rate over three years for all depreciable assets, this does not include 
manufacturing assets which are depreCiated at 100%. However, all SBCs pay STC on 
dividend distributions, regardless of their taxable income. 
According to the National Treasury, the tax concessions granted to SBCs in 2005, came 
at a cost of R1 ,4 billion to the fiscus. This reflects to a great extent the positive focus that 
the government has towards encouraging small businesses in South Africa. However, 
the discussion that follows outlines one of the important areas where significant 
improvements in the tax implications of SBCs are still lacking. As previously asserted, 
although the tax relief provided by the taxation treatment of small business corporations 
is not targeted at only back owned small businesses, these tax concessions also 
contribute to the attainment of black economic objectives as a significant number of 
these small businesses are owned by black people. 
3.7.4 The tax treatment of personal service companies 
In his first maxim of taxation, Adam Smith (1776) as quoted in Black et al (2005: 122) 
stated: 
The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the 
government. .. in proportion to their respective abilities ... in proportion to the 
revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state. 
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The above quote states to an important principle of taxation, that of tax equity which is 
an important characteristic of a "good" tax system. An analysis of a microcosm of the 
South African economy, personal service companies, indicates that the current tax 
regime governing the taxation of these schemes is punitive and in breach of the maxim 
of equity in tax. The intention of this analysis therefore is to outline the effect of these 
punitive tax provisions on small businesses, on broad-based economic empowerment 
and on general macro-economic activity and establishing the actual tax implications on 
these companies. 
Currently, there is a significant number of small, medium and micro enterprises (referred 
to as SMMEs) which are taxed as "personal service companies" as defined in paragraph 
1 of the Fourth Schedule to the Income Tax Act. The definition as contained in the Act is 
as follows: 
"Personal service company" means any company (other than a company which is 
a labour broker), where any service rendered on behalf of such company to a 
client of such company is rendered personally by any person who is a connected 
person in relation to such company, and--
a) such person would be regarded as an employee of such client if such 
service was rendered by such person directly to such client, other than on 
behalf of such company; or 
b) such person or such company is subject to the control or supervision of such 
client as to the manner in which, or hours during which, the duties are 
performed or are to be performed in rendering such service; or 
c) the amounts paid or payable in respect of such service consist of, or include, 
earnings of any description which are payable at regular daily, weekly, monthly 
or other intervals; or 
d) where more than 80 per cent of the income of such company during the year 
of assessment, from services rendered, consists of or is likely to consist of 
amounts received directly or indirectly from anyone client of such company, or 
any associated institution as defined in the Seventh Schedule to this Act, in 
relation to such client, 
except where such company throughout the year of assessment, employs more 
than three full-time employees who are on a full-time basis engaged in the 
business of such company of rendering any such service, other than any employee 
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who is a shareholder or member of the company or is a connected person in 
relation to such person. 
It is generally accepted that there is an expected and acceptable tax liability to be borne 
by all taxpayers, or at least this should be the case. The taxation of some SMMEs, 
however, is such that the effect of the taxation of these operations as "personal services 
companies" as defined, is that the entire income generated is subjected to employees' 
tax. This results in 35 percent of gross receipts paid to such operations being withheld 
by the clients for the payment of PAVE, resulting in cash flow constraints for the small 
businesses. 
In addition, there is a limit on the level of deductions allowed for the determination of 
taxable income. Effectively only salaries paid to employees are allowed as a deduction. 
According to section 23(k) of the Income Tax Act, a personal services company is not 
allowed to deduct any other expenses incurred other than the amounts paid or payable 
to any employee of such company for the purposes of determining the company's 
taxable income. The disallowing of the remainder of other bona fide business expenses 
incurred in the production of income for the type of trade in question, results in cash flow 
constraints and an unequal tax burden on these small businesses. Further, it is argued 
that these tax costs have made and could potentially make some of these operations 
technically insolvent and put them in a loss-making position for prolonged periods of 
time. It is arguable therefore that there is a strong case that the expenditure incurred in 
the production of income should be allowed as deductions under the normal general 
deduction formula as contained in section 11 (a) read with section 23 of the Act, or 
allowed as a specific deduction. 
However, it must be borne in mind that the definition of a "personal service company" 
does not apply if the company employs more than three full-time employees throughout 
the year of assessment, provided that these full-time employees are not connected 
persons in relation to the owner of the operation and the number of full time employees 
requirement excludes the owner/shareholder of the business. In this regard, although 
BEE is an important policy objective of the government, it is also important to highlight 
that one of the most significant policy objectives of the government is employment 
creation. Most small, medium and micro enterprises targeted for incentive and tax policy 
stimulus and support mechanisms are based on the assertion that SMMEs are engines 
of economic growth and employment creation. It is accurately attested to by Black et al 
49 
(2005) that tax relief measures should be intended and aimed at the promotion of job 
creation and improvement in cash flow for small businesses. 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted both the tax provisions which can be seen as aiding BEE 
transactions and those which inhibit the process. The chapter speCifically looked broadly 
into the following, in no particular order: taxation of the transfer of assets by companies, 
the taxation of trust income and how this would involve BEE transactions, the taxation of 
broad-based share incentive schemes, the tax implications of inter-company loans and 
the taxation of SBCs. 
Importantly, a discussion of the corporate restructuring rules was carried out which 
highlighted the potential usefulness of the provisions of these sections to the cause of 
BEE. However, it was indicated that complying with these provisions is not an easy 
matter. As such, their usefulness may sometimes be jeopardised by an inability of 
parties to BEE transactions to understand the provisions. Additionally, a discussion of 
the taxation implications of small business corporations was included. In this regard it 
was found that although significant improvements have been made by government to 
improve the way small businesses are taxed, there are still areas of concern. For the 
purposes of this thesis, the taxation challenges facing 'personal service companies' were 
highlighted. The nature of the tax obstacles discussed throughout the chapter further 
illustrate the need to re-Iegislate and amend those sections of tax legislation and tax 
practice in order not to only achieve economic growth by means of a less punitive tax 
regime but to also attain alignment between government policies and the current 
legislative regime. 
The following chapter provides a further illustration of the need to amend tax legislation 
to be more conducive to BEE realities. The discussion that follows is on the taxation 
treatment of preference share schemes, with a particular focus on section 8E and 
section 8F of the Act. The analysis is done in view of the prominence of preference 
share funding schemes, hybrid debt and equity instruments in the current BEE 
environment. 
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Chapter 4: The tax treatment of preference shares, hybrid financial instruments, 
the general deduction formula and the tax deductibility of interest 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 dealt with a number of provisions of the Income Tax Act which are relevant in 
terms of BEE policies. This chapter discusses the provisions of section 8E of the Act. 
The analysis covers the importance of the use of preference share funding for both the 
financiers and the client and the rationale thereof. Although the discussion is not entirely 
based on BEE transactions, inferences are drawn as to the usefulness of these funding 
structures to BEE objectives of the government. Further, the amendments of section 8E 
which took effect on the 26 October 2004 are discussed in order to highlight what the 
new taxation effects are on the preference share funders, in particular the financial 
sector which also plays a significant role in funding BEE transactions. 
Additionally, the provisions of a new section, section 8F are also discussed. The purpose 
of this section is to counter tax avoidance measures by ensuring that equity is not 
disguised as debt. The section is analysed as it has potential tax hurdles for the raising 
of debt by BEE companies as well, if hybrid debt instruments as defined are used. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the deductibility for tax purposes of interest 
expenditure incurred on monies raised to acquire shares. The discussion is particularly 
relevant to the prevalent use of debt funding by BEE participants in order to acquire 
shares. An analysis is made of how the deductibility of this interest expenditure could 
potentially hamper wide BEE equity participation. 
4.2 The rationale for the use preference share funding 
In Huxham et al (2004: 347), there is an accurate discussion of the rationale which 
underpins the general use of preference share funding. The description is as follows: 
The way the scheme worked was that, instead of borrowing money and paying 
interest on the loan, a company would issue preference shares to the "lender" 
(that is the bank) and pay dividends on the shares. The investor (lender) would 
receive the dividend free of normal tax, whereas had it received interest, the 
interest would have been liable for tax. As the dividend was tax free, the lender 
was prepared to accept a rate of dividend, which was lower than the rate of 
interest charged on a loan . The "borrower" would therefore have obtained a 
cheaper form of finance. Usually the borrower had an assessed loss and so did 
not mind paying a dividend on preference shares (not tax-deductible) as opposed 
to interest on a loan (usually tax deductible). 
The foregoing can be further illustrated by way of an example adapted from Zinman 
(2004). Assume that a bank was prepared to offer a conventional loan to a customer at a 
rate of ten percent. Taking into account the tax-exempt nature of dividend income, the 
rate that the bank would require to take up preference shares in that same company 
would equate to the after-tax rate it would earn on the above conventional loan, that is: 
10.00 percent / (1 + the relevant company tax rate) 
Assuming that the relevant tax rate is 29.00 percent = 7.5 percent 
As quoted in Huxham et al (2005), Corbett JA (1985: 191) stated in Commissioner for 
Inland Revenue v Standard Bank of South Africa Limited, 47 SATC 179, at 191 [also 
referenced at 1985 (4) SA 485 (A)l: 
From the Bank's point of view, the non-taxability of the dividend holds no 
particular advantage since the coupon rate is correspondingly lower than the 
interest rate on a medium-term loan (which interest is taxable) would be. 
Moreover the security afforded by a preference share issue is inferior to that 
pertaining to a loan in that in the latter case the Bank has the status of a creditor 
and in the former is merely a shareholder. 
However the reason banks are generally prepared to offer this product to clients; was 
succinctly put by Corbett JA (1985: 191), as quoted in Huxham et al (2005), when 
assessing the preference share policy of Standard Bank: 
The Bank does participate ... in a small number of redeemable preference share 
transactions at the customer's request. Generally the Bank is prepared to do so in 
order to accommodate special customers, with whom it has a long 
banker/customer association which might be prejudiced by a refusal, and also 
customers of high financial standing where there is a possibility of expanding the 
Bank's business with that customer. 
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For the purposes of this thesis and forming an integral and recent addition to the range 
of strategic transactions for which a financier may want to utilise its preference share 
capacity is black economic empowerment transactions. The emphasis and importance 
that the South African Government has placed on local companies selling equity to BEE 
entities, as shown through various legislative enactments, regulations and specific sector 
charters, has presented the financial sector especially, with increased funding 
opportunities. 
In addition therefore, Zinman (2004) discusses the need to consider the set of 
circumstances that are required in order for a bank client to enjoy the maximum benefits 
of issuing preference shares to the institution as opposed to simply taking out a loan 
from the bank. He (Zinman: 2004) claims that there are various circumstances where 
preference share funding is suited to both the issuer and the investor. Two of the more 
common examples are discussed hereunder. 
Firstly, according to Zinman (2004: 40) "Where a company receives only income that is 
exempt from taxation, e.g. a special purpose vehicle (SPV) or holding company that 
receives dividends as its only source of income, or where the company is exempt from 
tax, this provides an ideal opportunity to issue preference shares". Since the income 
earned by these types of entities is not taxable, any expenditure incurred in the 
production of that income is also not deductible - including interest expenditure. 
Therefore, by paying dividends, as opposed to interest, as the cost for its finance, the · 
entity is not 'missing out' on the deductibility of interest, and can take advantage of the 
lower rate of financing that a bank would offer on preference share funding when 
compared with conventional loan finance. 
BEE companies often fall into the above category. In these transactions, typically, a 
special purpose vehicle is specifically created to hold the shares in a company that is 
selling off a portion of its equity to BEE partners. Zinman (2004: 42) explains that: 
An SPY has as its sole source of income the dividends that flow to it from the 
shares it owns (but has not yet paid for). Therefore, this SPY is a prime 
candidate to be funded through preference shares, as opposed to through a 
traditional loan . Since the income earned by the SPY is not taxable, any 
expenditure incurred in the production of that income is also not deductible, 
including interest on a loan. 
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As outlined by Mahabane (2005), preference shares have indeed been used to fund 
investment holding companies in BEE transactions. Mahabane (2005: 9) further argues 
that: 
The structure employed, in general terms, is such that to finance the 
purchase of those shares, a bank purchases preference shares issued by 
the SPV. Provided that the dividends paid on the shares in the company to 
the SPV are greater than the rate at which the SPV is required to pay 
dividends to the bank, the SPV (and thereby its BEE owners) will come to 
own and pay for its shares in the company. 
Another common situation where the benefits of preference share funding can be fully 
taken advantage of is: 
[w]here a company is in a tax loss or anticipates being in a tax loss position 
for the foreseeable future. In this instance, as a result of the tax loss, the 
company is not able to capitalise on the tax deductibility of the interest 
expenditure that it would be incurring on a traditional loan (Zinman, 2004: 
42). 
Therefore, Zinman (2004) says it makes sense for the company to issue preference 
shares and pay non-deductible dividends, as opposed to taking out a bank loan on 
which it would pay deductible interest. In this way, Zinman (2004) argues, the company 
obtains a lower rate of funding, while not being prejudiced because of the fact that the 
dividends it pays out are not tax deductible. The foregOing situation also forms an 
important reason why section BE of the Income Tax Act was introduced as an anti-
avoidance provision. The provisions of this section are discussed in more depth below. 
In many instances, as Mahabane (2005) argues, the cost of the finanCing for the BEE 
entity to enable it to purchase shares is critical to the economic viability of many BEE 
transactions. Therefore, the lower cost of financing that preference shares provides, has 
made this instrument an often essential element of many BEE deals. Arguably therefore, 
these structures, are to a Significant extent, important instruments of the attainment of 
the government's BEE objectives. Hence there is a strong argument, as advised by 
Kolitz et al (2004), that in order to accelerate investment, government should introduce 
financial and tax incentives in empowerment transactions and/or structures, as it is 
argued that preferential tax provisions will encourage largely white-owned companies to 
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take the steps necessary to integrate previously disadvantaged individuals into the 
economy. 
Although the writer of this thesis agrees with the above mentioned contention, it must be 
noted , however, that where the real economic benefits and entitlement to profits accrue 
to the private sector, it is unjustifiable to lobby that the inherent business risks are 
inequitably borne by the public sector. Additionally, whereas the need for BEE policy 
implementation and practice is an undeniable business and government imperative, the 
processes to be followed should also embrace enhanced business efficiency. This 
echoes a need for big business, while empowering previously disadvantaged groups to 
own businesses, to enjoy financial independence and self-determination. 
4.3 The impact of section BE 
Scholtz (2005) explains that section BE of the Act is a provision aimed at the use of 
redeemable, or potentially redeemable, preference shares. Where the provisions of this 
section apply, the dividends paid on the particular shares are treated as interest income 
in the hands of the recipient. However, the same proceeds will continue to be treated as 
dividends at the level of the company which issued the dividends. Additionally, as 
Meyerowitz (2004: 13) states, section BE "was enacted to overcome a situation where a 
company, usually with a tax loss, issues short term preference shares so that the holder 
can enjoy the tax exemption on dividends instead of paying tax on interest on a loan to 
the company." 
A large number of BEE transactions have featured the prevalent use of preference share 
funding schemes, which particularly aided the BEE participants to obtain significant 
funding at competitive rates . In this regard, Scholtz (2005) argues that where the 
dividend income earned by the financier in a preference share funding scheme is caught 
by the provisions of section BE, in view of the income to the financier being no longer 
exempt from tax, the financier's return is significantly jeopardized and as such there 
might be a need to increase the borrowing rate on the finance agreement for the BEE 
partiCipants. 
This section (section BE), has since been materially amended by the Revenue Laws 
Amendment Act No. 32 of 2004, which amendments came into effect on 26 October 
2004 (Jordaan et al: 2005). According to Scholtz (2005), the effect is that now the 
dividends earned from preference shares might be classified as interest under a wider 
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range of circumstances. The discussion which follows below is analysis of the provisions 
of section BE before and after the October 2004 amendments. 
4.3.1 Section 8E prior to the 26 October 2004 amendments 
Section BE applies to 'affected instruments' issued after the 'effective date' - which is 23 
March 19B9. However, the dividends of certain 'affected instruments' that were issued 
before the 'effective date' do fall under the ambit of section BE, to the extent that those 
dividends are declared after a certain 'earliest date' that falls after the 23 March 19B9 
(De Koker et al: 2005). The 'earliest date' is the earliest date upon which such an 
'affected instrument': 
• became or would have become redeemable or repayable ; 
• could, at the instance of the holder, have been redeemed or repaid; or 
• could, at the instance of the holder, have been acquired by any party by 
reason of the exercise of a right of acquisition (De Koker et ai, 2005: 47). 
Additionally, Zinman (2004) advises that if an 'affected instrument', that was issued after 
23 March 19B9, can be converted into any other share, the 'earliest date' will be the 
earliest date on which it could be converted by the holder and the other share could 
have been redeemed at the instance of the holder. For the purposes of this thesis, it has 
been assumed in all discussions below, that the preference shares concerned were 
issued after the 'effective date.' The principal reason for the introduction of section BE is 
to deem a dividend declared by a company, that qualifies as an 'affected instrument' as 
defined in section BE, to be interest received from a source within South Africa in the 
hands of the recipient of that interest income. 
The old section BE(1) of the Act defines an 'affected instrument' as follows: 
(a) Any redeemable preference share where-
(i) The company is obliged to redeem the share in whole or in part within 
a period of three years from the date of issue; or 
(ii) The holder has an option to require the company to redeem the share 
in whole or in part within a period of three years from the date of 
issue; or 
(iii) The holder has a right of acquisition which may be exercised within 
three years from the date of the issue; 
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(b) Any other share, where the holder has a 'right of acquisition' in respect of 
such share which may be exercised within a period of three years from the 
date of issue of such share, and -
(i) Such share does not rank pari passu as regards its participation in 
dividends with all other ordinary shares in the capital of the company; 
or where the ordinary shares are divided into two or more classes, 
with the shares of at least one of such classes; or 
(ii) Any dividend payable on such share is to be calculated by reference 
to any specified rate of interest; or 
• The amount of capital subscribed for such share; or 
• The amount of any loan or advance made directly or indirectly by 
the shareholder or any connected person in relation to the 
shareholder. 
The definition of 'right of acquisition' is therefore important to determine whether a 
particular preference share qualifies as an 'affected instrument' . It , in effect, means a 
right that a holder of the preference shares has to force another party to buy those 
shares (Huxham et al: 2003). It is defined in section BE as follows: 
A right which the holder of an affected instrument has to require any party-
(a) To acquire such affected instrument from such holder; or 
(b) To procure, facilitate or assist with the redemption in whole or in part of 
such affected instrument or the repayment in whole or in part of the capital 
subscribed for such affected instrument or the conversion of such affected 
instrument into any other share which is redeemable in whole or in part 
within a period of three years from the date of issue thereof. 
Furthermore, according to section BE(2), dividends paid on 'affected instruments' are 
deemed to be interest received by the recipient (the bank) alone. "This deeming applies 
only to the recipient and not also to the company declaring the dividend , i.e. as far as the 
company is concerned it remains a dividend declared by it." (Meyerowitz, 2004: 36). 
Thus, while the financier would be taxed on the preference dividends that it receives (to 
the extent that those preference shares are deemed 'affected instruments'), the issuing 
company is still regarded to having paid dividends and not interest. Therefore, the 
company is not able to claim those dividend payments as a deduction (since dividend 
payments are not tax deductible), as it would have been able to do had it paid out 
interest expenditure, and will still be liable to pay STC on those dividends. It is therefore 
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clear why section 8E is regarded as a particularly punitive section - in the above 
scenario, where section 8E applies, the worst possible tax dispensation is created. 
4.3.2 Section BE after the 26 October 2004 amendments 
The provisions of section 8E have been amended by the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 
No. 32 of 2004, which came into effect on 26 October 2004. The definition of the term 
'affected instrument' has been deleted and replaced with 'hybrid equity instrument.' 
Subsequently, the definition of 'hybrid equity instrument' has been enacted and is 
defined in section 8E(1) of the Act as: 
(a) any redeemable preference share which the relevant company is obliged 
to redeem in whole or in part within a period of three years from the date 
of issue thereof, or which may at the option of the holder be redeemed in 
whole or in part within the said period, or in respect of which the holder 
has a right of disposal which may be exercised within the said period; or 
(b) any other share if-
(i) the holder has a right of disposal in respect of such share which may 
be exercised within a period of three years from the date of issue 
thereof or at the time of issue of that share, the existence of the 
company issuing that share is to be terminated within a period of three 
years or is likely to be terminated within such period upon a 
reasonable consideration of all the facts at the time that share is 
issued; and 
(ii) such share does not rank pari passu as regards its participation in 
dividends with all other ordinary shares in the capital of the relevant 
company or, where the ordinary shares in such company are divided 
into two or more classes, with the shares of at least one of such 
classes, or any dividend payable on such share is to be calculated 
directly or indirectly with reference to -
(aa) any specified rate of interest; or 
(bb) the amount of capital subscribed for such share; or 
(cc) the amount of any loan or advance made directly or indirectly by 
the shareholder or by any connected person in relation to the 
shareholder. 
According to Clegg (2005), with regard to paragraph (a) above, it should be noted that 
the provisions of section 8E will not apply to any redeemable preference share where 
the company is obliged to redeem such share only after three years from date of issue or 
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is entitled to redeem them within three years. The section will also not be applicable in 
circumstances where the holder has an option to request redemption of such share after 
three years or if he has a 'right of acquisition' that may be exercised after three years 
only. 
Under the 'old' section BE, Meyerowitz's stance (2004) was that section BE is triggered 
only if the right to call for redemption within three years is unconditional, and is conferred 
on the date of issue of those shares. The new, expanded definition of 'date of issue', 
includes any date after the original date of issue of the instrument, when the holder of 
the instrument (that is the bank or financial institution) acquires an unconditional 'right of 
disposal' in respect of that instrument - including the right to force any third party or the 
issuer of that share to redeem the instrument. The definition of 'date of issue' has been 
added to the section and is defined in relation to a share in a company as follows: 
the date on which it was issued by that company; 
the date on which its holder at any time after it is issued acquires a right of 
disposal, otherwise than as a result of its acquisition by him; 
the date on which the company at any time after it is issued undertakes the 
obligation to redeem it in whole or in part; and 
the date on which its holder at any time after it is issued obtains the right to 
require it to be redeemed in whole or in part, otherwise than as a result of its 
acquisition by him. 
In the way described above, Meyerowitz's (2004) contention that section BE is only 
applicable if the right to call for redemption or to put the instrument to a third party is 
conferred on the original date of issue is no now longer a valid one. With the 
amendments to section BE, if the date or right of redemption or ability to put the 
preference share is changed at any time after the date when the instrument was 
originally issued (whether it is reduced or extended), this new date will constitute a new 
'date of issue'. Likewise, if a put option is granted in circumstances where it previously 
did not exist, the put option would create a new 'date of issue' for the preference share, 
even if the original date of redemption remains unchanged. 
In addition, the added definition of the 'date of issue' signifies additional situations of 
disguised debt. According to Mitchell et al (2005), importance is placed on the 
redemption features added after the initial date of issue of the share. This could be 
illustrated by way of an example, Assume that a BEE company originally issued a non-
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redeemable preference share, and subsequent to the original date of issue, alters the 
terms of the share to make it redeemable within three years. In this case, section 8E 
would apply on or immediately after the alteration. 
The Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill, 2004 provides 
that the three-year period referred to in section 8E is determined from the date: 
of issue of the share; 
subsequent to its issue, when the company undertakes to wholly or partially 
redeem it at a future date; and 
subsequent to its issue, when the holder obtains the right to require it to be 
redeemed in whole or in part. 
Moreover, the definition of a 'right of acquisition' has been deleted and replaced by the 
definition of a 'right of disposal'. In terms of paragraph (a) of the definition of a 'right of 
disposal', this means a right that the holder of a hybrid equity instrument has to require 
any party to acquire it from him. Additionally, in terms of paragraph (b) of the definition of 
a 'right of disposal', this means a right to procure, facilitate or assist with the redemption 
in whole or in part of it, or the repayment in whole or in part of the capital subscribed for 
it, or the conversion of it into any other share in whole or in part within a period of three 
years from the date of issue as defined. This 'right of disposal' is in many ways similar in 
substance to the previously used 'right of acquisition' . It is interesting to note, however, 
that the definition of 'right of disposal' distinguishes between a scenario where the holder 
has a right to put the preference share to a third party, and where the holder has a right 
to require a third party to assist in the redemption of that instrument. Importantly, the 
concept refers to the right as such, and not when the right is ultimately exercised. In 
other words, it is the moment when the right accrues that is critical, not when that right is 
actually exercised. 
Scholtz (2005) correctly notes that although section 8E (as amended) was not intended 
to inhibit BEE transactions, it will, howecer, have an inhibitory effect. The reason is that 
"Any measure which (like section 8E) constrains the obtaining of finance or finance at 
competitive rates, will inhibit BEE transactions" (Scholtz, 2005: 2). 
4.4 The introduction of section SF 
According to the Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill , 
2004, " ... the provisions of section 8F came into operation on 26 October 2004 and apply 
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to any instrument issued or transferred to an issuer during any year of assessment 
commencing on or after that date". 
In broad terms, section BF is aimed at countering the prevalent disguising of equity 
instruments as debt, where the substance of the underlying agreement affords the 
parties to the 'hybrid debt' scheme the right to enjoy the tax benefit afforded by debt 
obligations, whilst they reserve in effect the right to alter the agreement into equity within 
a three year period. Mitchell et al (2005) argue that the effect of section BF is the 
limitation of the deductions of interest incurred by persons other than natural persons for 
hybrid debt instruments that are debt in legal form, but have sufficient equity features 
that they can be placed at the equity-end of the debt equity-scale. In an attempt to match 
the provisions of section BE, section BF will apply to those instruments which are 
exchangeable into equity shares in a period of three years. 
Section BF provides that the three-year period is determined from either: 
• the date on which the instrument is issued; or 
• the date on which it becomes convertible into, or exchangeable for, a share if 
these rights are created subsequent to the actual date of issue. 
The following definitions in section BF are adapted from the comments contained in the 
Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill, 2004. 
'date of issue' in relation to an instrument means-
(a) the date on which it is issued; and 
(c) the date on which that instrument becomes convertible into or exchangeable 
for a share at any time in the future. 
'hybrid debt instrument' means an instrument, where 
(a) that instrument is at the option of the issuer convertible into or 
exchangeable for any share in that issuer or any connected person in 
relation to that issuer within three years from the date of issue of that 
instrument; 
(b) the issuer in relation to that instrument is entitled to repay that instrument 
in whole or in part within three years from the date of issue of that 
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instrument by the issue of shares by the issuer or any connected person in 
relation to the issuer to the holder of the instrument; 
(c) the issuer in relation to that instrument is entitled to repay that instrument 
in whole or in part within three years from the date of issue of that 
instrument and is entitled at the time of that repayment to require the 
holder of that instrument to subscribe for or acquire shares in the issuer or 
any connected person in relation to the issuer; or 
(d) that instrument, other than a listed instrument issued by a listed company, 
is at the option of the holder convertible into or exchangeable for any 
share in the issuer or any connected person in relation to the issuer within 
three years from the date of issue and it is determined on the date of issue 
that the value of that share at the time of conversion or exchange is likely 
to exceed the value of the instrument by at least 20 per cent. 
In terms of section 8F(2), no deduction is allowed for any amount paid or payable by an 
issuer in terms of a hybrid debt instrument, that is paid or becomes payable after it 
becomes a hybrid debt instruments as defined. Therefore, where the provisions of 
section 8F apply the interest incurred in terms of the hybrid debt instrument will be 
disallowed as a deduction for the determination of taxable income, whilst the amounts 
received in terms of the instrument will be taxed as interest income in the normal way. 
By way of an example adapted for the purposes of this research from Mitchell et al 
(2005), section 8F would cover a situation where, for instance, a BEE company issues 
interest-bearing debentures to Financier A. Each debenture is convertible into BEE Co's 
shares at the option of the holder within a three year period from the date of issue. There 
is a substantial appreciation in the value of the shares in BEE Co's shares by the time 
the debentures are exchanged by Financier A. The appreciation is estimated to be 20 
percent. In terms of section 8F(2), where the necessary provisions of section 8F are 
satisfied, the interest expenditure incurred by BEE Co on this particular instrument is not 
deductible after it becomes a hybrid debt instrument. 
In addition, to confirm the inherent nature of these transactions, section 64C(2)(h) has 
been amended. This section now provides that for the purposes of section 64B, an 
amount is, subject to the provisions of section 64C(4), deemed to be a dividend declared 
by a company when that amount is incurred by the company in question in terms of any 
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interest to which the provisions of section 8F apply. The effect of this amendment is that 
for the BEE company in the example above, the interest incurred in terms of a hybrid 
debt instrument is deemed to be a dividend declared for the purposes of determining 
secondary tax on companies ("STC") liability. The BEE company therefore would not 
only be out of pocket from the disallowed interest expenditure deduction, but could also 
be saddled with additional tax liabilities in terms of STC. 
4.5 The general deduction formula 
Section 11 (a) read with section 23 of the Act, contains the general deduction formula. 
Clegg (2005) advises that the relationship between these two sections was clearly set 
out in the case of Oosthuizen v Standard Credit Corporation limited, 1993 (3) SA 891 
(A), 55 SATC 338, that: 
Section 11 (a) provides positively and in general terms what expenditure and 
losses shall be allowed as deductions from income so derived in order to 
determine his taxable income. Section 23 prescribes what deductions may 
not be made .in the determination of taxable income. It is generally 
appropriate to consider whether or not a deduction is permitted by 
section 11 (a) and whether or not it is prohibited under section 23. 
Section 11 (a) provides for the deduction from income derived from the carrying on of 
trade, expenditure and losses actually incurred in the production of the income, provided 
that such expenditure and losses are not of a capital nature. There is a fair amount of 
literature about the contents of the general deduction formula. Huxham et al (2004) 
summarises the contents of the general deduction formula as follows: 
Section 11 (a) requirements: 
expenditure and losses; 
actually incurred; 
during the year of assessment; 
in the production of income; and 
not of a capital nature. 
In addition to the above requirements, section 23(g) provides that the deduction of 
" ... any moneys claimed as a deduction from income derived from trade to the extent to 
which such moneys were not laid out or expended for the purposes of trade ... " are 
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prohibited as deductions. In order to outline an adequate context of the provisions of the 
general deduction formula, the requirements of section 11 (a) are adapted mainly from 
Huxham (2004) and discussed briefly and in broad terms separately below. 
4.5.1 Expenditure and losses 
Although there is case law alluding to a difference which may exist between losses and 
expenditure, it is not clear whether in reality this distinction exists. Nonetheless the Act 
refers to both expenditure and losses. The case referred to for this distinction is as 
quoted in Huxham et al (2004: 64), the English case of Allen v Farquharson Brothers 
and Co, where the distinction between losses and expenditure was considered as 
follows: 
Expenditure means something or other which the trader pays out; I think 
some sort of volition is indicated. He chooses to payout some disbursement; 
it is an expense; it is something which comes out of his pocket. A loss is 
something different. That is not a thing which he expends or disburses. That 
is a thing, so to speak, comes upon him ab extra. 
As previously asserted, the writer of this thesis concedes that this distinction does not 
appear to be a major consideration for the allowance of deductions in both tax legislation 
and practice. It is sufficient to incur an amount which is either a loss and/or expenditure. 
4.5.2 Actually incurred 
Huxham et al (2004) argue that it is not necessary for the amount incurred to have been 
incurred prudently or not. The requirement to pass the 'actually incurred' test is merely 
that the amount was incurred, that is, the money is owed. Moreover, as outlined in 
Huxham et al (2004: 64), in the case of Caltex Oil (SA) Ltd v SIR, 1975 AD, Botha JA 
stated: 
The expression "expenditure actually incurred" in section 11 (a) ... means all 
expenditure for which the liability has been incurred during the year whether 
the liability has been discharged during that year or not. 
The principle that is shown by the above statement is that, notwithstanding that the 
responsibility to pay the amount incurred does not have to be carried out within the 
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particular current year of assessment, the obligation or the incurrence of the amount 
must nevertheless be unconditional in the particular year of assessment. 
4.5.3 During the year of assessment 
Huxham et al (2004: 65) admits that "this particular requirement is not specifically 
mentioned in section 11 (a), but the courts have held that the expenditure which the 
taxpayer claims as a deduction, must be incurred during the year in which it is claimed". 
Also quoted in Huxham et al (2004: 65), is the case of Sub Nigel Ltd v CIR, 1948 AD, 
where it was held as follows: 
For the whole scheme of the Act shows that, as the taxpayer is assessed for 
income tax for a period of one year, no expenditure incurred in a year 
previous to the particular tax year can be deducted . 
To rank for deduction in a particular year therefore, the expenditure and/or losses in 
question must have been incurred in the year during which the claim for deduction is 
lodged. 
4.5.4 In the production of income 
This is arguably the most important requirement of section 11 (a) in terms of the general 
deduction formula. Clegg (2005) advises that if expenditure is incurred in the production 
of income which is exempt from tax, or it is not incurred in the production of income, it 
will not rank for deduction. Furthermore, Clegg (2005: 7) also states that " ... expenditure 
incurred for the purpose of earning income is incurred in the production of income, 
irrespective of whether any income is actually produced ... " Quoted in Clegg (2005) is the 
leading case of Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway Co Ltd v CIR, 1936 CPO 241 , 8 SATC 
13. The issue at hand was discussed therein as follows: 
The purpose of the Act entailing expenditure must be looked to. If it is 
performed for the purpose of earning income, then the expenditure attendant 
upon it is deductible ... The other question is what attendant expenses can 
be deducted . How closely must they be linked to the business operation . 
Here, in my opinion, all expenses attached to the performance of a business 
operation bona fide performed for the purpose of earning income are 
deductible whether such expenses are necessary for its performance or 
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attached to it by chance or are bona fide incurred for the more efficient 
performance of such operation provided they are so closely connected with it 
that they may be regarded as part of the cost of performing it. 
Concerning the above mentioned case, Huxham et al (2004), comment that what is 
important for consideration is for the expenditure in question to be "an inevitable 
concomitant" of the business operations which actually produce income. The must be a 
close link between the expenditure incurred and the actual 'machinery' (used advisedly) 
that produces income. 
4.5.5 Not of a capital nature 
This requirement is considered in tandem with the principles enshrined in the definition 
of gross income, as contained in section 1 of the Act. Huxham et al (2004: 68) agrees in 
stating that" .. .. just as capital receipts and accruals do not fall into gross income, capital 
expenses are not allowed as a deduction from income in terms of section 11 (a)". It is 
important to note however, that there is provision in specific sections of the Act, for the 
deduction of specific capital expenditure items. 
In view of the fact that the Act does not specify which expenditure is capital and which 
revenue is, Clegg (2005: 10) quotes Watermeyer CJ, when he stated: 
The conclusion to be drawn from all these cases seems to be that the true 
nature of each transaction must be enquired into in order to determine 
whether the expenditure attached to it is capital or revenue expenditure. Its 
true nature is a matter of fact and the purpose of the expenditure is the 
important factor; if it is incurred for the purpose of acquiring a capital asset 
for the business it is capital expenditure even if it is paid in annual 
instalments; if on the other hand it is in truth no more than part of the cost 
incidental to the performance of the income producing operations, as 
distinguished from the equipment of the income producing machine then it is 
a revenue expenditure even if it is paid in a lump sum. 
Generally, it would appear the above statements allude to the fact that expenditure 
incurred in the acquisition capital or other tangible assets would have an inherent capital 
nature and therefore not rank for deduction as envisaged in the general deduction 
formula. 
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4.6 Tax deductibility of interest on amounts incurred to acquire shares 
For the purposes of this thesis however, the focus is on the tax deductibility of interest 
incurred on loans raised to acquire shares. This is particularly relevant to the issue of 
black economic empowerment transactions , where it is often the case that a BEE 
company would need to raise borrowed funds to acquire a significant shareholding in an 
enterprise, especially in the context of certain industry charters. According to section 
23(f), interest incurred on a loan raised to acquire shares in order to earn tax-free 
dividend income (dividends are generally tax exempt in terms of section 10(1 )(k)), is not 
deductible. However, Clegg (2005) states that as provided by section 1 0(1 )(k), 
generally interest arising on funds borrowed to purchase shares will be deductible only if 
the taxpayer is a sharedealer, since the interest is not necessarily incurred in order to 
produce dividends which do not constitute income in the hands of the taxpayer. 
Clegg (2005) further advises, that in the case of CIR v Shapiro 1928 NPD 436, 4 SATC 
29, a taxpayer borrowed money in order to purchase shares in a company from which he 
derived a salary and commission. He claimed that the interest should be allowable as a 
deduction against his salary. The court held that the salary and commission were 
produced not by the shareholding, but by the exercise of his duties, and hence the 
interest was disallowed. The issue then, the writer of this thesis assumes, was that the 
taxpayer could not prove to the court that the purchase of the shares was suffiCiently 
closely linked to the generation of the income in question (apart from the tax free 
dividend income derived). 
It can, however, be argued that although the purchase of shares by BEE companies 
affords them the opportunity to derive tax exempt dividend income, the essential context 
of these transactions is that of economic emancipation and empowerment. The 
substance of these transactions is therefore inherently different from the normal share 
purchase transactions in the commercial sense. Clegg (2005) outlines that in ITC 1553 
(1992), 55 SATC 105, the taxpayer sought to deduct interest paid on loans from its 
subsidiary, which were raised to repay existing loans to its directors. The loans from the 
directors were originally used to acquire shares in the subsidiary. The court held that the 
deductibility of the interest in respect of the new loans must be determined by reference 
to the purpose for which the old loans were raised, which was to acquire the shares and 
to earn management fees from the subsidiary. The court found that there was no direct 
link between the expenditure incurred and the income derived by the taxpayer. 
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In the case of BEE transactions, there is arguably a direct link between the incurrence of 
interest expenditure on loans raised to acquire shares and the future income (apart from 
tax free dividend income) earned by the BEE companies in terms of future business 
growth and establishment, broad based economic empowerment and so on. A 
Significant number of these BEE share purchase transactions feature the postponement 
of dividend earnings for significantly long periods of time. This is done in order to 
prioritise the repayment of the debt raised to purchase the shares. There is therefore a 
mis-match between the time periods within which the Commissioner for the SARS 
derives revenues from the taxable interest income on the financiers' or supply side, and 
the time the BEE participants derive the commensurate dividend income on the demand 
side. This sacrifice, which is a general characteristic of these deals, should at the very 
least be rewarded by the deduction from income of the interest expenditure incurred on 
the underlying loan agreements. The potentially adverse result is the situation where the 
BEE participants are out of pocket because of tax (that is, when no dividend income is 
yet derived), at times where high and significant debt service obligations are present. 
This defeats the spirit of empowerment and counters the attainment of the objectives of 
the BEE Act. 
In addition, Huxham et al (2004) discusses the case of CIR v Allied Building Society. 
1963 AD, where the court held that the ultimate use or destination of money lent was not 
to be the decisive factor in determining the deductibility of interest payable on that 
money. The enquiry to be made is " ... what was the true nature of the transaction?" It is 
important to stress again, that although the form of the share purchase transactions by 
BEE participants appears to be that of a normal commercial transaction, it cannot be 
argued that the essence of these transactions is casual investment in shares for the 
mere purpose of earning of dividend income. 
The non-deductibility of interest on money borrowed to buy shares brings in turn an 
increase in the effective cost borne by the borrower, in this case the BEE participants. 
Scholtz (2005: 2) rightfully notes that "It is the refusal of the tax system to allow interest 
deductions on funds borrowed to buy shares which must be the most fundamental brake 
upon wide equity participation by black people". Furthermore, Scholtz (2005) advises 
that the Australian tax system treats dividends as 'assessable but rebatable', the rebate 
granted sometimes more than offsets the tax liability which arises from the entitlement to 
derive dividend income. Consequentially, the interest incurred on money borrowed to 
purchase shares is deductible. This approach, Scholz (2005) argues, has made a 
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significant contribution to the Australian government's goal of making Australia a 'nation 
of shareholders'. 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has dealt with certain provisions in the Income Tax Act which may inhibit 
BEE empowerment structures. This chapter has provided an analysis of the provisions 
of section BE both prior to and after the recent amendments to the section introduced by 
the Revenue Laws Amendment Act, 32 of 2004. On one hand, this chapter analysed the 
rationale and benefits of the use of preference share funding by banks. This was done 
through a brief discussion of the case law which exists on the use of similar funding 
structures by the banks. On the other hand, the thesis also considered the usefulness of 
preference share funding for the promotion of BEE objectives. In this regard, although 
the provisions of section BE have historically been viewed as punitive, the recent 
amendments to the section further exacerbate these views. The concern is that these 
provisions, albeit new, may have the ultimate consequence of increasing the costs of 
preference share funding for the financing sector and ultimately discourage the use of 
preference share structures that fund BEE as well. The provisions of a new section, 
section BF have also been discussed. It was highlighted that this section has the 
potential to further increase the tax costs of BEE transactions, where 'hybrid debt 
instruments' are used . 
In a certain sense, section BE may be less restrictive that it appears, as making 
provision for a redemption period exceeding three years in the original conditions of 
issue would not present an insurmountable hurdle, but may pose a considerable 
inconvenience. Section BF would close certain avenues in BEE transactions, where a 
BEE company, which finds it difficult to meet its interest commitments, may wish to 
convert the debt instruments into equity instruments. 
Finally, a discussion of the general deduction formula was included. The purpose was to 
set out the context within which expenditures incurred in the production of income are 
allowed as deductions in terms of sections 11(a) and section 23 of the Act. Following 
through from this discussion, was the pertinent discussion of the provisions of section 
23(f) which prohibit the deduction of interest expenditure incurred on amounts raised to 
acquire shares. It is considered that this discussion is particularly relevant to BEE, as 
most funding used in share purchase transactions is debt funding. BEE transactions are 
therefore not only saddled with increased tax costs, they are also potentially out of 
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pocket as a result of the refusal by the South African tax system to allow the deductions 
from income, of expenditure incurred in the process of acquiring shares. 
The unfortunate result of the provisions in the Income Tax Act that have been discussed 
in this chapter is that transactions structured in a way that makes good commercial 
sense may have to be re-structured simply to circumvent the tax obstacles. 
The next chapter illustrates additional tax hurdles which BEE participants may face, 
using a BEE structured company case study in the financial sector. 
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Chapter 5: Case study: A BEE deal in the financial sector 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapters three and four discussed various provisions in the Income Tax Act which have 
a potential impact on BEE transactions or structures. In order to highlight the significant 
tax hurdles inherent in entering into a BEE transaction, this chapter firstly analyses an 
actual funding structure and outlines the likely tax costs all the parties may be faced 
with, taking into account the current legislative framework. The analysis of the taxation 
consequences of these transactions are limited to the following areas: 
• the taxation consequences should "Sub Co" and "BEE Co" be considered to be 
connected persons for taxation purposes; 
• whether the Commissioner could successfully attack the purchase price 
allocation for the sale of the ordinary shares to "BEE Co" otherwise than through 
the connected person rules; 
• whether the share buy-back of the ordinary shares owned by "Hold Co" will be 
considered a dividend, a capital gain or both; 
• whether "Sub Co" would be liable for additional STC if it on-declared dividends 
received from "Private Co" to Financier 1, to service the preference share 
dividends; and 
• the likely effect of section BE on dividend income received from preference 
shares held. 
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5.2 Outline of the funding mechanism" 
A 100 percent BEE owned consortium entity "BEE Consortium" wishes to acquire shares 
in "Sub Co" from "Hold Co". The proposed funding mechanism that would enable BEE 
Consortium to acquire the shares is as follows: 
A merchant bank "Financier 1" will subscribe for R140m preference shares in "Sub Co". 
The preference shares will be redeemable after five years and will yield a fixed dividend 
for the period. 
13 These details were divulged at an interview between the writer of this thesis and L. Mangquku 
- Director Investments: Bancar Investments (Pty) Ltd . The names of the parties to the deal are 
replaced by the artificial names in inverted commas above given by the writer of this thesis in 
order to maintain confidentiality. 
14 ibid 
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Private 
Co 
Sub Co will utilize R135m of the preference share capital raised to carry out a share buy 
back of a portion of the ordinary shares in Sub Co from Hold Co in terms of section 85 of 
the Companies Act No. 61 of 1973 ("the Companies Act"). The additional R5m will be 
used to settle the transaction costs. 
After the share buyback has been completed, Sub Co will sell 67,5 percent of the shares 
in Sub Co to BEE Co for R100 000. In addition, BEE Co and Hold Co will enter into a 
put/call arrangement covering the remaining 32,5 percent of Sub Co shares held by Hold 
Co. In terms of this arrangement, Hold Co will be entitled to put the remaining shares to 
BEE Co at any time after year three for R65m ("the put option") and BEE Co will be 
entitled to buy the shares from Hold Co for R65m ("the call option"). This exercise is 
dependent upon BEE Co being able to raise the finance needed to acquire the 32,5 
percent on the strength of its investment in Sub Co. 
The exercise of the options will also be dependent upon BEE Co not defaulting on its 
banking covenants by entering into the share purchase agreement for the 32,5 percent 
remaining shareholding held by Hold Co. 
Sub Co will cede 100 percent of its income (only dividends from Private Co) to Financier 
1. These dividends will be paid into a sinking fund and will be used to service the 
preference share dividends and any excess will be kept for the early redemption of the 
preference shares at any time after the expiry of three years. 
For the purposes of this research, it has been assumed that the sale by Hold Co of its 
shares in Sub Co will be treated on capital account so that Hold Co will be liable for CGT 
as opposed to income tax as a result of this disposal. 
When asked to give a detailed breakdown of the areas of concern in terms of the 
taxation implications of the BEE deal above, which was structured by his company, the 
following is adapted from the responses that Mangquku (2005) gave at the interview: 
5.3 Connected persons provisions 
Quoted from the Income Tax Act, the definitions of "connected person" in relation to a 
trust and a company as set out in section 1, are relevant in this instance. 
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5.3.1 A Company 
A connected person in relation to a company is defined in paragraph (d)(i) to (vA) 
of the definition of a "connected person" as: 
o its holding company as defined in section 1 of the Companies Act; 
o its subsidiary as so defined; 
o any other company where both such companies are subsidiaries as 
defined of the same holding company; 
o any person, other than a company as defined in section 1 of the 
Companies Act, who individually or jointly with any connected person 
holds directly or indirectly more than 20 percent of the equity share capital 
or voting rights of such company; 
o any other company if at least 20 percent of the equity share capital is held 
by the other company and no shareholder holds the majority of the voting 
rights of such company; 
o any other company if such company is managed or controlled by 
• any person who or which is a connected person in relation to such 
company; or 
• any person who or which is a connected person in relation to the 
connected person contemplated above. 
It is also important to note that the connected person rules effectively provide that, 
if A is a connected person in relation to B, then B is also a connected person in 
relation to A. Mangquku (2005). [Also refer to paragraph (e) of the definition of 
"connected person".] 
In terms of paragraph 38 of the Eighth Schedule of the Act, if an asset is disposed 
of to a connected person for a consideration which does not reflect an "arms length 
price", then the purchase price will be set at the market value of the asset for tax 
purposes. Although the Commissioner would generally not be able to adjust the 
agreed purchase price between parties for the sale of goods for tax purposes, the 
Commissioner can do this if the parties are connected persons as defined by the 
Income Tax Act. 
According to Figure 1 above, Sub Co owns a 40 percent stake in Private Co. "A 
valuation by both BEE Co and Financier 1 revealed that this is worth between R190m 
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and R260m. Sub Co has an option to acquire an additional 14 percent in Private Co for 
R60m. Sub Co currently has no other material assets or liabilities" Mangquku (2005). 
According to the writer of this thesis, it would accordingly seem that the market value of 
the ordinary shares in Sub Co is R200m, and that the deal reflected in Figure 1 above 
has been negotiated on this basis. 
As can be seen in Figure 1 above, it is proposed that Financier 1 will subscribe for 
preference shares in Sub Co to the value of R140m. Using a value of R200m for the 40 
percent interest in Private Co, the implied market value of the ordinary shares held by 
Sub Co will be R60m after taking into account the R140m liability of the preference 
shares issued to Financier 1. 
Mangquku (2005) further advised that: 
It could be argued that the market value of the 100 percent ordinary shares owned 
by Hold Co in Sub Co is R60m after the share buy-back, the payment of expenses 
and the preference share issue. Therefore 67,5 percent sold to BEE Co may have 
a market value of R40m and that any consideration less than this may result in a 
CGT liability as such consideration will not be seen as an arm's length price for the 
67,5 percent. This could mean that where Sub Co only receives R100 000 for the 
sale of 67,5 percent ordinary shares, Sub Co will be liable for CGT on R40m up-
front if the agreed price is significantly less for the 67,5 percent sale of shares. 
Similarly, if BEE Co were to acquire the remaining 32,5 percent of the 
shareholding in Sub Co for R65m (assuming that Hold Co will exercise the option), 
and this consideration does not reflect an arm's length price for the remaining 32,5 
percent at the time of the transaction, the Commissioner would again be entitled to 
deem the transaction to have taken place at the market value of that 32,5 percent 
at the time of the disposal (in this case year 3). 
It is therefore quite likely that the Commissioner would attempt to apply paragraph 
38 of the Eighth Schedule to increase Sub Co's proceeds from the sale of shares, 
which would have the effect of increasing BEE Co's cost. It would be up to the 
parties concerned, according to section 82 of the Act to prove to the Commissioner 
that the consideration paid for the 67,5 percent sale of shares was indeed an 
"arm's length price". 
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These tax hurdles could be removed if the Income Tax Act could be amended to 
accommodate the price-setting measures which are necessary to enable BEE parties to 
purchase such steep levels of ownership inherently out of their reach in terms of funding . 
5.3.2 Value shifting 
Mangquku (2005) also argued that: 
Transactions between connected persons could also in principle be affected by the 
rules dealing with value shifting arrangements in Schedule Eight to the Income Tax 
Act, in instances where there is a reorganization of a company's share capital. 
However, if the change in interest in a company is as a result of a transaction at 
market value (before the application of paragraph 38 of the Eighth Schedule) then 
it is not necessary to consider the application of the value-shifting arrangement 
rules . 
However, should the transaction not be at market value, then, in terms of 
paragraph 35A of the Eighth Schedule, Sub Co will effectively be treated as having 
disposed of the 67,5 percent shareholding for proceeds equal to the market value 
of the stake immediately after the transaction, as opposed to the market value prior 
to the transaction. 
It is important therefore for BEE parties to investigate the applicability of the connected 
person rules and see whether it could be possible to arrange the relationships between 
the parties so that the potential risk is mitigated. 
5.4 Tax treatment of the share buy-back 
Additionally, Mangquku (2005) outlined that section 85 of the Companies Act, 61 of 
1973, allows subsidiaries to purchase their own shares, up to ten percent from their 
holding companies. 
"Sub Co will purchase its own shares from Hold Co and this will constitute a payment 
from share premium, which arose on the preference share subscription by Financier 1 in 
Sub Co" Mangquku (2005). A payment from share premium arising from a fresh share 
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issue is not considered to be a dividend for taxation purposes and, as a result, Sub Co 
should not be liable for STC on this payment to its shareholder. 
Similarly, Hold Co should treat this payment as proceeds from the disposal of the shares 
in question and not as a dividend received. However, Hold Co will then not be able to 
rely on the tax exemption relating to dividends received in terms of section 10(1 )(k)(i), 
but will be liable for CGT, and would not be entitled to deduct the amount received from 
dividends it declares, for the purposes of calculating the STC on the dividends it 
declares. 
5.5 Possible effect of section 8E 
The writer of this thesis argues that if the dividends paid to Financier 1 in terms of the 
preference share subscription, are caught under section 8E, the end result might be that 
the dividend income will be treated as interest income for tax purposes. The adverse 
impact on the BEE parties is this possibility. Financier 1 might be obliged to seek a 
higher rate of return than that under the preference share scheme, on all the loans that 
formed part of the facilitation of the overall share purchase transaction. However, it is 
worth noting, that section 8E is unlikely to have adverse effects on long-term financing 
arrangements, as this section is meant to affect predominantly the situation where a 
financier redeems preference shares or disposes them of within the three year period as 
defined. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the adverse taxation effects for BEE transactions, resulting 
from the 'connected persons' provisions of the Income Tax Act. It was found that where 
the Commissioner is satisfied that an asset is disposed of to a connected person for a 
consideration which does not reflect an 'arm's length price', according to paragraph 38 of 
the Eighth Schedule, the Commissioner can set the price or consideration at the market 
value of the asset in question for tax purposes. This would increase the cost of the 
assets being sold and possibly increase the tax liability arising from the transaction in 
question. 
The chapter also discussed the likely effects of value-shifting arrangements in Schedule 
Eight to the Income Tax Act , which according to paragraph 35A could also increase the 
price or proceeds to the market-value equivalent for tax purposes. These rules are 
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however not applicable if the change in the interest in a company is as a result of a 
transaction which took place at the applicable market values. Lastly, the chapter 
provided a brief analysis of the tax treatment of share buy-backs, and it was concluded 
that in a share buy-back, a payment from share premium arising from a fresh share 
issue would not be considered to be a dividend and therefore no STC liability would 
arise. The corollary is that the recipient would not treat the proceeds as a dividend 
received, and would therefore receive them on capital account and would not be entitled 
to deduct the amount for STC purposes. 
It is considered that, although other legal considerations are essential for most 
successful commercial transactions, tax exposures are increasingly becoming the most 
expensive and prominent considerations of BEE transactions and businesses. It is also 
important to understand that although tax is a consideration in major BEE transactions, 
the provisions of the Act which are seen as inhibitive to the process were not introduced 
to restrict the flourishing of BEE transactions; these are genuine anti-avoidance 
provisions introduced to counter the excessive use of financing schemes which may 
eventually have an erosive effect on the tax base and revenue of the country. The 
challenge that this poses therefore, is obtaining the necessary alignment in tax 
legislation between adequate allowances necessary to encourage BEE transactions and 
anti-avoidance provisions, which aim to prevent the erosion of the tax base. 
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Chapter 6: Summary of findings and recommendations 
6.1 Introduction 
This thesis has considered the importance of the relationship between tax legislation, tax 
practice and black economic empowerment (BEE). This was done by means of a 
literature review, conducted in order to outline the context of BEE in South Africa. 
Additionally, the literature review was also carried out with a view of analysing the views 
of different writers in the context of BEE and taxation. In chapter two the thesis outlined 
the legislative framework upon which black economic empowerment has been founded. 
From this discussion it transpired that there is a firm legislative framework to support 
BEE transactions and other economic empowerment initiatives. 
The following is the summary of the findings and recommendations, which have been 
the subject of the discussion reflected in chapter one to chapter five. 
6.2 Corporate restructuring rules 
It is argued that the corporate restructuring rules provide scope to some BEE 
transactions in order to roll over income or capital gains for the purposes of income tax 
or capital gains tax, provided the provisions of sections 41 to 47 are met. However, it is 
also considered that the so-called corporate restructuring rules, in so far as they are 
relevant to the process of the transfer of assets, company formations, amalgamations 
and share-for-share transactions, are potentially onerous. Although the legislation 
governing these rules has been amended frequently, this has not been done to simplify 
the tax provisions for BEE transactions. The restrictive nature of the application of this 
legislation may have the unfavourable consequence of taxpayer non-compliance, with 
significant amounts of time and resources devoted to the avoidance of the taxes. 
Furthermore, taxpayers may even avoid entering into BEE restructuring, lest they fall 
foul of a provision and be saddled with very Significant tax costs, which may ultimately 
erode the business value in terms of industry charter compliance and the commensurate 
business opportunities that would have been otherwise gained by executing the 
restructures. The corporate restructuring rules also do not apply to other forms of 
enterprise, for example trusts, which may be appropriate vehicles for special categories 
of BEE deals. 
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It must be noted that corporate restructures and rationalisations have positive economic 
effects, for example BEE equity participation and employee share schemes , These 
structures should therefore be accommodated and encouraged, The Simplification of the 
corporate restructuring rules are all very important tax issues in respect of BEE 
transactions, and should be a cause for further research and tax pol icy reform, 
6,3 Debt transactions and inter-company loans 
This thesis has also analysed the provisions of sections 8(4)(m) and 20(1 )(a)(ii) of the 
Income Tax Act as well as paragraphs 12(5) and 56 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act. 
These have been analysed in so far as they relate to the conversion of debt obligations 
(to equity), especially as relating to previously deductible debt-related expenditure, 
Cognisance also needs to be had of the benefits that could be derived from 
compromises with creditors in BEE transactions, Such compromise benefits fall within 
the ambit of either section 8(4)(m) or paragraphs 12(5) and 56 of the Eighth Schedule, 
and section 20(1 )(a)(ii), The company to which such debt re lief was made would be 
subject to tax on the gain made when the loan was written off, The recommendation for 
BEE taxation, would be the position where the need to retain the funds in the BEE 
company or the BEE compliant company for further investment in similar projects would 
be recognised, possibly even as an incentive, This could then lead to an exemption from 
income tax or capital gains tax, when the debt write-off from a holding company for 
instance to the BEE subsidiary is the issue in question, 
6.4 Taxation of trusts 
In addition, trusts have historically proven to be very useful strategic business vehicles, 
They have also been useful in estate planning, jOint ventures, and joint-holdings of 
business assets and BEE, to represent the interests of the groups of people. In other 
instances they have been used to facilitate partial company ownership by employees 
and community broad-based trusts with beneficiaries often not identifiable at formation. 
Trusts are also attractive business vehicles because of advantages like limited liability, 
no audit requirement (strictly speaking), and other exemptions applicable only to trusts 
as opposed to companies (including close corporations) as governed and defined by the 
Companies Act, 61 of 1973 or the Close Corporations Act, 69 of 1984, 
Some concessions granted to companies by the corporate restructuring rules are not 
available when the party to the rationalisation scheme is a trust. In addition, the 
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application of the highest marginal tax rate on trust income (except for special trusts) is a 
further point of concern. Trusts are commonly used as business vehicles and their tax 
regime appears prejudicial when compared to other business vehicles like close 
corporations and companies. However, trusts still prove to be useful in commercial 
structures, for example employee-share trusts and broad-based (community) trusts. It is 
for the reasons mentioned above that trusts should be considered to be instruments of 
the future in BEE transactions. It is commonly known that the Commissioner of the 
SARS dislikes trusts and views them generally as instruments of tax avoidance. It is 
recommended that the economical use of these trust schemes in the context of BEE 
should be encouraged either by a reduction in the tax rate applicable to trust income or 
by taxing trusts in the same way as companies or close corporations and other similar 
business vehicles. 
6.5 Disposal or acquisition of equity shares 
It appears that the new section in the Act, section 24N, lends itself to encouraging BEE 
equity disposal transactions. This section defers the inclusion in gross income or the 
deduction from income, of amounts arising from a disposal of equity shares , which are 
not quantifiable in the year of assessment during which the shares are disposed of. Such 
amounts then only accrue or rank for deduction in the year in which they become due 
and payable. This is acknowledged as an important contribution of legislation to the 
cause of black economic empowerment. 
6.6 Tax treatment of preference shares and hybrid financial instruments 
This thesis has also analysed the advantages for taxpayers and financiers of the 
utilisation of preference shares as a source of finance. The motivation for this is the fact 
that financiers are prepared to accept a lower preference share dividend rate, since 
dividend income is tax exempt, relative to a higher interest rate on a conventional loan, 
with interest income being fully taxable. The main reasons for financiers to offer 
preference shares as a form of funding have also been discussed. Other reasons 
include the attraction and retention of strategic clients and the likely STC credits that 
accrue to the bank by taking up preference shares. 
Additionally, the thesis also discussed the extent to which banks can use preference 
shares as a means of funding clients. This was based on the judgment in CIR v 
Standard Bank of South Africa Limited, 47 SATC 179, at 197. Although it is understood 
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that government has a mandate to fight general tax avoidance, it is important to look into 
those anti-avoidance provisions which significantly increase the tax burden on financiers 
and could potentially make BEE funding costly in terms of the taxation implications. 
Section 8E of the Act is currently seen in this light. The recent amendments as 
discussed in this thesis seem to have the potential to make it expensive for financiers to 
fund BEE transactions using preference share funding, when the shares are redeemable 
within a three year period. Although the bigger BEE deals are funded over a much 
longer time frame, it is considered that those BEE transactions which fall within the 
three-year time frame are made tax expensive by provisions of section 8E, when they 
are applicable. It is recommended that where the provisions of section 8E are applicable, 
the expenditure incurred in the production of the deemed 'interest income' be allowed as 
a deduction or at least for STC to be waived when section 8E is applicable. 
Additionally, the provisions of a new section in the Income Tax Act, section 8F have also 
been discussed. The purpose of this section is to counter the prevalent use of debt 
instruments, with sufficient equity characteristics such that these instruments could be 
easily allocated to the equity side of the debt-equity continuum. To match the provisions 
of section 8E, section 8F also governs 'hybrid debt instruments' that are exchangeable 
into shares/equity within a three year period from the date of issue. Section 8F has the 
potential of being a further obstacle to the raising of debt finance for BEE transactions 
and structures . Where the provisions of this section apply, the interest expenditure 
incurred on the debt instruments will be disallowed as a deduction, after the debt 
obligation becomes a 'hybrid debt instrument' as contemplated in section 8F(1) of the 
Income Tax Act. 
6.7 The general deduction formula and tax deductibility of interest expenditure 
incurred on amounts raised to acquire shares 
A discussion of the general deduction formula as contained in sections 11(a) and 23 of 
the Income Tax Act was carried out. This was done in order to set the foundation for the 
discussion of the deductibility of interest incurred on loans raised to acquire shares. The 
deductibility of such interest expenditure is expressly prohibited in section 23(f) of the 
Income Tax Act. From the analysis it was clear that the provisions of the Income Tax 
Act prohibiting the deductibility of interest incurred on amounts raised to acquire shares 
was aimed at countering the deductibility of expenditure incurred in the production of tax 
exempt income, that is dividend income. It is argued, however, that generally the 
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purchase of shares by BEE parties is not solely founded upon the desire to earn 
dividend income. This is reflected in the inherent feature of BEE transactions which 
postpone the earning of dividend income for prolonged periods of t ime in order to repay 
debt raised to acquire such shares. In this regard, it is considered that the interest 
incurred on loans to acquire shares by BEE participants should be deductible. It is the 
inability of the current tax system to allow such deductions that appears to be one of the 
significant impediments to wide-spread equity participation by BEE counterparties. 
6.8 Connected persons rules 
The thesis illustrated , by way of a case study, the likely adverse effects of the 
"connected persons" rules in the Income Tax Act as contained in section 1 and 
paragraph 38 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act and how these could affect BEE deals. 
The analysis revealed that these tax hurdles could be removed or reduced if the Act 
could accommodate some price-setting mechanisms, which are designed by taxpayers 
to aid BEE transactions, as was illustrated in the case study transaction. This should be 
done bearing in mind the significant funding challenges faced by the parties to BEE 
transactions. 
6.9 Taxation of small business corporations and personal service companies 
The thesis outlined the progress which has been made through targeted tax policy 
reforms in improving the tax regime governing the taxation of small business 
corporations . Some of these targeted tax provisions are contained in section 12E of the 
Income Tax Act. Although this was positive, there are still areas of concern, including the 
taxation of personal service companies as defined in Schedule Four to the Income Tax 
Act. 
The introduction of the provisions governing the taxation of personal services companies 
was aimed at combating the use of commercial incorporation with its inherent tax 
benefits for the avoidance of tax. As correctly noted by Black et al (2005) "each country's 
tax system has been established over time by many - often unique - forces, one should 
therefore be careful of generalising". For this reason, however, it is submitted that the 
business models of true economic empowerment such as some small, medium and 
micro enterprises which are adversely affected by the provisions governing the taxation 
of personal services companies, are unintentionally adversely affected by the current 
taxation regime. Further, it is asserted that these provisions could not have been 
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introduced to render non-viable those business schemes and commercial structures 
aimed at both supporting true broad-based economic empowerment, which are essential 
agents of employment creation and ultimately economic growth. The offending 
legislation should therefore either be removed or amended to take into account the 
importance of encouraging small, medium and micro enterprises businesses in the 
South African economy and especially in the context of BEE. 
6.10 General tax avoidance 
It is also imperative for tax authorities to understand that businesses will always seek the 
most tax efficient means in order to remain competitive. "If tax is seen only as a 
punishment, it is unlikely to induce more than minimum compliance, with considerable 
effort devoted to avoidance" (Jones, 1982: 22). It is with this understanding that a BEE 
transaction, which also results in the reduction or avoidance of some tax, should be 
encouraged and seen as economically viable. It can be justifiably said that mere 
compliance with the literal provisions of the legislation is not sufficient. Taxpayers need 
a clearer or more simple test to apply to business transactions within a comprehensive 
BEE tax policy framework or at least one that provides specifically for BEE. This would 
provide the necessary level of certainty (even in advance) that such transactions will not 
be prone to re-investigation simply because they also afforded the taxpayer in question a 
tax break. 
6.11 Conclusion 
It can be argued that effective tax reforms should be targeted at those areas which 
contribute or could potentially contribute to increased economic empowerment and 
sustainable economic growth. Additional tax reform goals, as stated in Black et al 
(2005), should include equitable revenue redistribution, promotion of equity, tax 
simplification and an efficient allocation of resources. Tax policy has implications for 
economic empowerment and growth. Moreover, to a significant extent, the funding of 
BEE structures enables previously disadvantaged groups to own and manage 
businesses and to obtain much needed expert skills. To this end, there is a pressing 
need to align government policy objectives pertaining to broad based black economic 
empowerment and the current tax treatment of the commercial structures, which bring 
about the realisation of these policy objectives. 
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However tax policy makers must take particular heed of tax avoidance opportunities, a 
usually non-targeted effect of tax policy reforms and/or incentives. These have the result 
of eroding the tax base significantly above the officially anticipated revenue losses for 
the South African Revenue Service and also result in unforeseen increases in the 
general tax burden borne by other taxpayers. 
It is considered that this thesis makes only a small contribution to the real challenge 
posed by the subject of taxing black economic empowerment transactions. The 
intricacies and sophistication in legislation concerning BEE transactions and how these 
can still be re-engineered to be more conducive to the legal certainty which is essential 
for business entering into BEE transactions, especially in a developing economy such as 
South Africa, will continue to be an area of challenging intellectual discussion and further 
research. However, what has been researched and analysed in this thesis is a 
contribution to the attainment of the ideal which Brenthurst (2003) stated as follows: "We 
want to move to where transformation is not a risk factor, but a growth factor". Tax 
authorities need to appreciate this and take up the challenge of legislating in a way that 
will be conducive to the South African way of doing business and the attainment of BEE 
objectives. 
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